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COMMENTS
STACKING OF BASIC ECONOMIC LOSS BENEFITS UNDER
THE MINNESOTA NO-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
ACT
[Wasche v. Milbank Mutual Insurance Co., 268 N.W.2d 913 (Minn.
1978)J.
I. INTRODUCTION
An extensive amount of litigation has been generated in recent years
over the stacking of insurance coverages. Frequently an injured person
will sustain damages in excess of the benefits available under a single
insurance policy. When an injured person fits the description of an
"insured" under two or more policies, the limits of each policy coverage
may be added to the others until the insured is indemnified to the full
extent of the actual injuries suffered or until the combined policy cover-
ages are exhausted.' "Stacking" refers to this right of an insured to
recover benefits from more than one policy.
The question of whether stacking would be permitted first arose in the
area of uninsured motorist insurance.' Today a majority of states, in-
cluding Minnesota,3 permit an injured victim to stack uninsured motor-
ist coverages when multiple vehicles and policies are involved.' The
1. Van Hoozer v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 219 Kan. 595, 608, 549 P.2d 1354, 1364-65 (1976)
("stacking" defined); see, e.g., Van Tassel v. Horace Mann Mut. Ins. Co., 296 Minn. 181,
187, 207 N.W.2d 348, 351-52 (1973) (stacking of uninsured motorist benefits permitted);
Davis, Uninsured Motorist Coverage: Some Significant Problems and Developments, 42
Mo. L. REv. 1, 17 (1977).
2. See generally Davis, supra note 1; Comment, Stacking of Uninsured-Motorist Cover-
age-An Exercise in Judicial Interpretation, 5 CUM.-SAM. L. REv. 106 (1974); Comment,
Insurance: "Other Insurance" Clauses Purporting to Limit Recovery Under Uninsured
Motorist Coverage Void as Repugnant to Statute, 58 MINN. L. REv. 677 (1974); Comment,
Intra-Policy Stacking of Uninsured Motorist and Medical Payments Coverages: To be or
Not to be, 22 S.D. L. REv. 349 (1977); Comment, Pyramiding of Uninsured Motorist
Protection: The Confusion Inherent in Overgeneralization, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 568 (1973);
Comment, "Stacking" Uninsured Motorist Protection, Medical Payments, and Personal
Injury Protection Coverages in Texas, 7 ST. MARY'S L.J. 837 (1976); Note, Stacked Recov-
ery Under the Uninsured Motorist Endorsement of the Automobile Liability Policy, 9 VAL.
U.L. REV. 135 (1974).
3. See Pleitgen v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 296 Minn. 191, 193-95, 207 N.W.2d 535, 537-38
(1973); Van Tassel v. Horace Mann Mut. Ins. Co., 296 Minn. 181, 207 N.W.2d 348 (1973);
cf. Taylor v. Great Cent. Ins. Co., 305 Minn. 446, 234 N.W.2d 590 (1975) (stacking per-
sonal liability insurance with uninsured motorist coverage); Brunmeier v. Farmers Ins.
Exch., 296 Minn. 328, 208 N.W.2d 860 (1973) (stacking workers' compensation payments
with uninsured motorist coverage).
4. See A. WIDISS, A GUIDE TO UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE § 2.60, at 128-29 (Supp.
1976). Inter-policy stacking occurs when there is more than one policy available to the
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second area in which the stacking question has arisen is in the field of
no-fault automobile insurance.5 In 1974 the Minnesota Legislature
adopted the Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act (Minnesota
Act).' Because the Minnesota Act requires every automobile registered
insured. Inter-policy stacking is to be distinguished from intra-policy stacking, which
applies when there is one policy insuring more than one vehicle. See Comment, Intra-
Policy Stacking of Uninsured Motorist and Medical Payments Coverages: To be or Not
to be, 22 S.D. L. REV. 349, 350 (1977). For purposes of this Comment, no attempt will be
made to analyze the conceptual differences between the two stacking concepts; the Min-
nesota court has not drawn a distinction between the two theories as applied to stacking.
As background information, however, some form of inter-policy stacking of multiple poli-
cies under uninsured motorist coverage is permitted by courts from the following states:
Alabama: General Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gilmore, 294 Ala. 546, 548-50, 319 So. 2d 675, 678
(1975); Alaska: Wereley v. United Servs. Auto Ass'n, 498 P.2d 112, 115-19 (Alaska 1972);
California: California State Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Huddleston, 68 Cal. App. 3d
1061, 137 Cal. Rptr. 690 (1977); Florida: Brooker v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 207 So. 2d
486 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 212 So. 2d 869 (Fla. 1968); Georgia: St. Paul Fire
& Marine Ins. Co. v. Goza, 137 Ga. App. 581, 224 S.E.2d 429 (1976); Hawaii: Walton v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 55 Hawaii 326, 518 P.2d 1399 (1974); Indiana: Patton v.
Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 148 Ind. App. 548, 267 N.E.2d 859 (1971); Kansas: Welch v.
Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 221 Kan. 344, 559 P.2d 362 (1977); Kentucky: Zurich Ins. Co. v.
Hall, 516 S.W.2d 861 (Ky. 1974); Louisiana: Sutton v. Langley, 330 So. 2d 321, 330 (La.
Ct. App.), cert. denied on three separate appeals, 332 So. 2d 805, 332 So. 2d 820, 333 So.
2d 242 (La. 1976); Michigan: Werner v. Travelers Indem. Co., 55 Mich. App. 390, 395-
401, 222 N.W.2d 254, 257-60 (1974); Minnesota: Pleitgen v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 296 Minn.
191, 193-95, 207 N.W.2d 535, 537-38 (1973); Mississippi: Harthcock v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 248 So. 2d 456, 461-62 (Miss. 1971); Missouri: Steinhaeufel v. Reliance Ins.
Cos., 495 S.W.2d 463 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); Montana: Mountain West Farm Bureau v.
Neal, 169 Mont. 317, 321-25, 547 P.2d 79, 82-83 (1976); Nebraska: Protective Fire & Cas.
Co. v. Woten, 186 Neb. 212, 181 N.W.2d 835 (1970); New Hampshire: Raitt v. National
Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 111 N.H. 397, 285 A.2d 799 (1971); New Jersey: Motor Club of
America Ins. Co. v. Phillips, 66 N.J. 277, 330 A.2d 360 (1974); New Mexico: Sloan v.
Dairyland Ins. Co., 86 N.M. 65, 519 P.2d 301 (1974); North Carolina: Turner v. Nation-
wide Mut. Ins. Co., 11 N.C. App. 699, 182 S.E.2d 6 (1971); Ohio: Curran v. State Auto.
Mut. Ins. Co., 25 Ohio St. 2d 33, 266 N.E.2d 566 (1971); Oklahoma: Keel v. MFA Ins.
Co., 553 P.2d 153, 155-56 (Okla. 1976); South Dakota: Westphal v. Amco Ins. Co., 87 S.D.
404, 209 N.W.2d 555 (1973); Texas: American Liberty Ins. Co. v. Ranzau, 481 S.W.2d 793
(Tex. 1972); Vermont: Goodrich v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 423 F. Supp. 838 (D. Vt.
1976); West Virginia: Bell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., - W. Va. -, 207 S.E.2d
147 (1974); Wyoming: Ramsour v. Grange Ins. Ass'n, 541 P.2d 35 (Wyo. 1975).
5. Twenty-four states have enacted no-fault automobile insurance plans. See Note,
Subrogation and Indemnity Rights Under the Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance
Act, 4 WM. MrrCHELL L. REV. 119, 120, 120-21 n.6 (1978) (citing statutes). For a general
discussion of the state no-fault acts, see I. SCHERMER, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE §
8 (rev. ed. 1978).
6. See Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act, ch. 408, 1974 Minn. Laws 762
(amended 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, and 1979) (codified as MINN. STAT. §§ 65B.41-.71)
[hereinafter cited as Minnesota Act].
A number of questions have arisen under the Minnesota Act since its inception in 1974.
For a comprehensive examination and analysis of some of the particular problems pre-
sented by the Minnesota Act, see J. SCHWEBEL, MINNESOTA NO-FAULT UPDATE (1979).
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in Minnesota to be insured by the owner,7 an injured person might be
an insured under more than one policy. Consequently, the question
arose under no-fault automobile insurance, as it did under the unin-
sured motorist cases, whether an injured person would be permitted to
stack basic economic loss benefits,' such as medical expenses, wage loss,
and other out-of-pocket expenses resulting from the injury,9 to the ex-
tent of actual loss suffered.
The Minnesota Supreme Court recently was presented with the issue
of whether basic economic loss benefits may be stacked under the Min-
nesota Act. In a consolidated appeal of two lower court cases, 0 the court
7. MINN. STAT. § 65B.48(1) (1978) states:
Every owner of a motor vehicle of a type which is required to be registered or
licensed or is principally garaged in this state shall maintain during the period
in which operation or use is contemplated a plan of reparation security under
provisions approved by the commissioner, insuring against loss resulting from
liability imposed by law for injury and property damage sustained by any person
arising out of the ownership, maintenance, operation or use of the vehicle. The
plan of reparation security shall provide for basic economic loss benefits and
residual liability coverage in amounts not less than those specified in section
65B.49, subdivision 3, clauses (1) and (2). The non-resident owner of a motor
vehicle which is not required to be registered or licensed, or which is not princi-
pally garaged in this state, shall maintain such security in effect continuously
throughout the period of the operation, maintenance or use of such motor vehi-
cle within this state with respect to accidents occurring in this state.
8. The terms first-party benefits, basic economic loss benefits, basic reparation bene-
fits, and personal injury protection benefits are synonymous and will be used interchange-
ably throughout this Comment.
9. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.44 (1978), as amended by Act of May 25, 1979, ch. 221, 1979
Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 469 (West). Basic economic loss benefits are most often paid by
an injured party's own insurance carrier and commonly reimburse an insured or an in-
sured's heirs for certain expenses. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.47(4)(a) (1978). Under section
65B.44, an injured victim is entitled to numerous benefits, including $20,000 for medical
expenses, see id. § 65B.44(1)(a), and $10,000 for wage loss and other related expenses. See
id. § 65B.44(1)(b). Medical expense benefits commonly reimburse an injured victim for
such expenses as surgery, x-rays, nursing services, prescription drugs, semi-private hospi-
tal rooms, and rehabilitative treatment. See id. § 65B.44(2), as amended by Act of May
25, 1979, ch. 221, § 1, 1979 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 469 (West). An injured person also is
entitled to disability and income loss benefits, subject to a maximum of $200 per week,
resulting from his or her inability to work. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.44(3), as amended by
Act of May 25, 1979, ch. 221, § 2, 1979 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 469 (West). Moreover, an
injured party is entitled to reimbursement of up to $15 per day for expenses incurred in
hiring a substitute to do the daily household chores that the injured party normally would
have done. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.44(5) (1978). Additional benefits provided by section
65B.44 include funeral and burial expense benefits of up to $1,250, see id. § 65B.44(4),
and survivors economic loss benefits of up to $200 per week for the contribution that a
decedent would have provided to surviving dependents for their support had the decedent
not died as a result of the motor vehicle accident. See id. § 65B.44(6).
10. See Bock v. Mut. Serv. Cas. Ins. Co., No. 734850 (Minn. 4th Dist. Ct. Jan. 9, 1978);
Wasche v. Milbank Mut. Ins. Co., No. 730578 (Minn. 4th Dist. Ct. Apr. 15, 1977).
19791
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in Wasche v. Milbank Mutual Insurance Co. "1 affirmed two lower court
decisions, holding that under the Minnesota Act an injured person may
stack basic economic loss benefits to the extent of actual injuries suf-
fered when two or more insurance policies are applicable on the same
priority level. 2
In the first case, Grace Wasche was injured in a collision between two
California automobiles while she was visiting in California.'" Wasche, a
Minnesota resident, was a passenger in one of the involved automo-
biles.' She sustained medical expenses in excess of $46,000 and, upon
her subsequent death, her estate incurred funeral expenses in excess of
$1,900.15 At the time of the accident, Wasche maintained residence in
Minnesota with her daughter-in-law, Delores Wasche, who owned two
automobiles and maintained a separate plan of insurance for each auto-
mobile."6 Although Grace Wasche did not own an automobile, she was
insured as a household member under her daughter-in-law's two insur-
ance policies." Because Grace Wasche's injuries exceeded the first-party
benefits of either of Delores Wasche's insurance policies," the personal
representative of Grace Wasche's estate sought to stack the first-party
benefits of both policies. 19 Milbank Mutual Insurance Company, the
insurer under both policies, tendered payment of one policy limit,
$21,250, for medical and funeral expenses, but refused to tender pay-
ment of the second policy limit, asserting that the Minnesota Act pre-
cluded stacking of basic economic loss benefits. 0 Holding that basic
economic loss benefits could be stacked, the trial court granted sum-
11. 268 N.W.2d 913 (Minn. 1978).
12. See id. at 919. The Minnesota Act establishes a series of priority levels that deter-
mine which insurance policy the injured party must look to for recovery of first-party
benefits. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.47 (1978). Because the injured party will frequently be
an insured under two or more policies on the same priority level, a question arises
whether the injured party's first-party benefits may be stacked. See id. § 65B.47(5).
13. See 268 N.W.2d at 915. Although the accident occurred in California and involved
two California vehicles, Wasche still was entitled to receive basic economic loss benefits
under the Minnesota Act. The Minnesota Act provides that a person injured in an acci-
dent occurring outside Minnesota who is an insured or an occupant of a motor vehicle
insured in this state will be entitled to receive first-party benefits. See MINN. STAT. §
65B.46(1)-(2) (1978).
14. See 268 N.W.2d at 915.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id. at 916 n.4. Grace Wasche was an insured under her daugher-in-law's two
policies because Grace was not identified by name in any other insurance policy while
residing in the household of Delores Wasche, the named insured. See MINN. STAT. §
65B.43(5) (1978). For the full text of section 65B.43(5), see note 29 infra.





William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [1979], Art. 4
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol5/iss2/4
STACKING OF NO-FAULT BENEFITS
mary judgment for Wasche's estate upon suit for the additional cover-
age.
21
In the second case, Clark Bock suffered serious injuries in a single car
accident while driving one of the two vehicles that he owned. 2 His
medical expenses exceeded $20,000 and therefore exceeded the policy
limits on the vehicle in which he was injured. 23 Mutual Service Casualty
Insurance Company insured both of Bock's vehicles, with each vehicle
insured under a separate policy. 2 Clark's father, who was living with
Clark at the time of the accident, also owned an automobile that was
insured by Mutual Service, although it was insured under the father's
name.2 5 Each of the three policies provided basic economic loss benefits
in the amount of $20,000 for medical expenses and $10,000 for wage loss,
replacement services loss, and other out-of-pocket losses, 2 as mandated
by the Minnesota Act.Y
When Clark sought to stack the first-party benefits of all three policies
to the extent of his actual injuries, Mutual Service asserted that the
provisions of the Minnesota Act precluded the stacking of first-party
benefits.2 8 The trial court granted Clark Bock's summary judgment mo-
tion to stack his own insurance policies up to the combined policy limits
of $40,000 but denied his motion to stack the father's policy, holding







27. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.44 (1978), as amended by Act of May 25, 1979, ch. 221, 1979
Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 469 (West).
28. See 268 N.W.2d at 915-16.
29. See id. at 915. The definition of "insured" is set out in subdivision 5 of section
65B.43 of the Minnesota Act, which provides:
"Insured" means an insured under a plan of reparation security as provided by
sections 65B.41 to 65B.71, including the named insured and the following per-
sons not identified by name as an insured while (a) residing in the same house-
hold with the named insured and (b) not identified by name in any other
contract for a plan of reparation security complying with sections 65B.41 to
65B.71 as an insured:
(1) a spouse,
(2) other relative of a named insured or
(3) a minor in the custody of a named insured or of a relative residing in the
same household with a named insured.
A person resides in the same household with the named insured if that person
usually makes his home in the same family unit, even though he temporarily
lives elsewhere.
MINN. STAT. § 65B.43(5) (1978). Under this definition, Clark Bock was not an insured
under his father's policy, although living in the same household, because he was
"identified by name" as an insured under his own insurance policies. Thus, the statutory
19791
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Although Minnesota permitted the stacking of uninsured motorist
coverages at the time the Minnesota Act was adopted, both insurers in
Wasche maintained that the Legislature did not intend to permit the
stacking of basic economic loss benefits under the Act. 0 This Comment
will analyze the rationale of the Wasche court by focusing on both the
statutory language of the Minnesota Act and the uninsured motorist
decisions of earlier years. Additionally, this Comment will discuss the
future problems that the Minnesota Supreme Court and Legislature
may be expected to address as a result of the Wasche decision.
U. ANALYSIS OF THE Wasche DECISION
In holding that basic economic loss benefits may be stacked, the
Minnesota Supreme Court reasoned that the provisions of the Minne-
sota Act did not expressly prohibit stacking." Moreover, the court stated
that neither insurer offered compelling reasons to distinguish the stack-
ing of compulsory basic economic loss benefits from the stacking of
uninsured motorist coverage, which was permitted at the time no-fault
automobile insurance was adopted.
32
A. Statutory Construction
The insurers in Wasche argued that the statutory language of the
Minnesota Act expressly prohibited stacking of no-fault benefits.3 First,
they asserted that stacking was inconsistent with the purposes and pro-
language expressly excluded him from coverage under his father's policy.
A recent Minnesota case, Anderson v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., 269 N.W.2d 702 (Minn.
1978), discussed the distinction between "insured" as interpreted prior to no-fault and as
interpreted after no-fault. In Anderson, the plaintiff was injured while riding as a passen-
ger in an uninsured automobile. The plaintiff was an "insured" while in her own automo-
bile, which was properly insured. At the time of the accident, she was living with her
stepfather who also owned two automobiles that were insured under two separate policies.
The stepdaughter received the full policy limits of her uninsured motorist coverage. Her
medical expenses, however, exceeded the $10,000 policy limit and she then attempted to
collect benefits under her stepfather's policies. The stepfather's insurance company
argued that the plaintiff was not an "insured" under the definition of "relative" in her
stepfather's policy and because she was an "insured" under her own insurance policy. Id.
at 703-04.
The insurer asserted that the restrictive language in its insurance policy was consistent
with a similar restriction imposed by the Minnesota Act that narrowly defined the word
"insured." See id. at 704-05. The Minnesota Supreme Court said, however, that plaintiff
was an "insured" under her stepfather's policy, holding that "[iin contrast to the present
no-fault law's explicit exclusion of persons already insured from coverage under.another
policy [section 65B.43(5)], the failure to so restrict 'relative' in § 65B.22, expresses a
purpose to include even those who own their own automobile." Id. at 705.
30. See 268 N.W.2d at 917.
31. See id.; notes 33-94 infra and accompanying text.
32. See 268 N.W.2d at 918-19; notes 95-115 infra and accompanying text.
33. See 268 N.W.2d at 917.
[Vol. 5
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visions of the Minnesota Act.3' Second, they claimed that the Minnesota
Act limited recovery of basic economic loss benefits to a maximum of
$30,0003 regardless of the number of insurance policies applicable.3 1
Finally, the insurers maintained that the Minnesota Act expressly pro-
34. See id. at 914-15.
35. See MiNN. STAT. § 65B.44(1) (1978).
36. See 268 N.W.2d at 917. The Oregon Supreme Court recently refused to allow stack-
ing under its no-fault statute. In Southwestern Ins. Co. v. Winn, 274 Or. 695, 548 P.2d
1311 (1976), the supreme court held that under the statutory provision then in effect,
stacking of personal injury protection benefits was not permitted even though the injured
party sustained medical expenses in excess of one policy limit. Id. at 699-700, 548 P.2d at
1313. In Winn, the insured was injured while riding as a passenger in a nonowned automo-
bile that was properly covered with no-fault insurance. The injured passenger also owned
an automobile that was insured with the necessary insurance coverage. Under Oregon law,
the primary insurer is the insurer of the host vehicle. Thus, the injured passenger received
the full amount of first-party benefits from the host's insurance carrier. When the injured
party made a claim for first-party benefits under his own insurance policy, the insurer
denied liability and brought an action for a declaratory judgment. Id. at 697-99, 548 P.2d
at 1311-13. The statutory provision in effect at the time of the Winn decision read as
follows:
(1) The insured, members of his family residing in the same household and
guest passengers injured while occupying the insured motor vehicle shall be
primary, but such benefits except for guest passengers may be reduced or
eliminated if they are similarly provided under another motor vehicle liability
policy that covers the injured person, or if the injured person is entitled to
receive under the laws of this state or any other state or of the United States,
workmen's compensation benefits or any other similar medical or disability
benefits.
Act of June 28, 1971, ch. 523, § 4, 1971 Or. Laws 912, 913, as amended by Act of July 21,
1973, ch. 551, § 4, 1973 Or. Laws 1214, 1216 (current version at OR. REV. STAT. § 743.810
(1977)) (emphasis added).
In reversing the trial court's decision, the Oregon Supreme Court stated that the statu-
tory phrase "may be reduced or eliminated" prevents the injured party from recovering
basic economic loss benefits from his own insurer when the insurer of the host vehicle
already has paid the full amount of its basic economic loss benefits to the injured passen-
ger. 274 Or. at 700, 548 P.2d at 1313.
Although not applicable to the Winn case, an amendment to section 743.810 in 1975
significantly altered the operative provisions of that section. See Act of July 8, 1975, ch.
784, § 3, 1975 Or. Laws 2248, 2251 (amending OR. REV. STAT. § 743.810 (1973)). Prior to
the 1975 amendment, subdivision 1 of section 743.810 stated that first-party benefits
covering the insured could be "reduced or eliminated if they are similarly provided under
another motor vehicle liability policy that covers the injured person." Act of June 28,1971,
ch. 523, § 4, 1971 Or. Laws 912, 913, as amended by Act of July 21, 1973, ch. 551, § 4,
1973 Or. Laws 1214, 1216 (current version at OR. REv. STAT. § 743.810 (1977)). This
language clearly prohibited stacking even though the insured had other available policies.
However, the 1975 amendment eliminated the phrase "are similarly provided under an-
other motor vehicle liability policy that covers the injured person." See Act of July 8, 1975,
ch. 784, § 3, 1975 Or. Laws 2248, 2251 (amending OR. REV. STAT. § 743.810 (1973)).
Currently, first-party benefits may be reduced or eliminated only by worker's compensa-
tion benefits or other similar insurance. See OR. REv. STAT. § 743.810(2) (1977). As a result
of this modification, the insurer apparently cannot reduce or eliminate the first-party
19791
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hibited stacking when more than one policy was applicable.37
1. Legislative Purpose
Based on the purposes of the Minnesota Act,3 the Wasche court con-
cluded that the legislators did not intend to prohibit the stacking of
first-party benefits. 39 If stacking were prohibited, a primary purpose of
the Minnesota Act-to relieve the severe economic distress suffered by
an uncompensated accident victim4 -would be defeated; an injured
party would remain uncompensated for any medical expense loss in
excess of the statutory minimum of $20,000,11 even though basic eco-
nomic loss benefits were available under a second policy. Second, per-
mitting the stacking of first-party benefits is consistent with the goal of
avoiding duplicate recovery,4 2 because stacking the available coverage
benefits the insured has under other applicable policies. By its own admission, the Winn
court said that section 743.810, as amended in 1975, "if applied to a case such as this,
may require a different result." 274 Or. at 700, 548 P.2d at 1313. Consequently, if pre-
sented with the stacking issue again, the Oregon Supreme Court may permit an insured
to stack first-party benefits.
37. See 268 N.W.2d at 917; MINN. STAT. § 65B.47(5) (1978).
38. MINN. STAT. § 65B.42 (1978) provides:
The detrimental impact of automobile accidents on uncompensated injured
persons, upon the orderly and efficient administration of justice in this state,
and in various other ways requires that sections 65B.41 to 65B.71 be adopted to
effect the following purposes:
(1) To relieve the severe economic distress of uncompensated victims of
automobile accidents within this state by requiring automobile insurers to offer
and automobile owners to maintain automobile insurance policies or other
pledges of indemnity which will provide prompt payment of specified basic
economic loss benefits to victims of automobile accidents without regard to
whose fault caused the accident;
(2) To prevent the overcompensation of those automobile accident victims
suffering minor injuries by restricting the right to recover general damages to
cases of serious injury;
(3) To encourage appropriate medical and rehabilitation treatment of the
automobile accident victim by assuring prompt payment for such treatment;
(4) To speed the administration of justice, to ease the burden of litigation
on the courts of this state, and to create a system of small claims arbitration to
decrease the expense of and to simplify litigation, and to create a system of
mandatory inter-company arbitration to assure a prompt and proper allocation
of the costs of insurance benefits between motor vehicle insurers;
(5) To correct imbalances and abuses in the operation of the automobile
accident tort liability system, to provide offsets to avoid duplicate recovery, to
require medical examination and disclosure, and to govern the effect of advance
payments prior to final settlement of liability.
39. See 268 N.W.2d at 919-20.
40. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.42(1) (1978).
41. See id. § 65B.44(1)(a).
42. See id. § 65B.42(5). The Minnesota Act also provides for setoffs and coordination
of benefits when the insured is entitled to receive benefits from any other source as a result
[Vol. 5
8
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [1979], Art. 4
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol5/iss2/4
STACKING OF NO-FAULT BENEFITS
indemnifies an insured only to the extent of the actual loss suffered and
does not permit double recovery.43 In both lower court cases in Wasche,
the plaintiffs had sustained medical expenses in excess of the coverage
available under a single policy. Although permitted to stack first-party
benefits, neither insured received duplicate payments for the same ele-
ment of loss; rather, the insureds were compensated only for their actual
injuries."
The insurance companies' argument that the Legislature intended to
prohibit stacking does have merit, however . 5 Permitting the first-party
benefits to be stacked may cause an increase in the cost of insurance
of injuries arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle. See id. § 65B.61, as
amended by Act of May 3, 1979, ch. 57, 1979 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 86 (West). Although
not defined by the Minnesota Act, "duplicate recovery," as used throughout this Com-
ment, means that the insured may not be paid twice for the same injury. See, e.g., Ruder
v. West Am. Ins. Co., 151 Ind. App. 433, 434-35, 280 N.E.2d 68, 69 (1972); Welch v.
Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 221 Kan. 344, 349-50, 559 P.2d 362, 367 (1977).
43. See, e.g., Welch v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 221 Kan. 344, 349-50, 559 P.2d 362, 367
(1977).
44. In rejecting Milbank Mutual's assertion that stacking is in derogation of the Minne-
sota Act, the lower court stated:
Stacking the basic economic loss benefits under the two policies presently
before this Court does not of course result in a windfall to plaintiff since even
the stacked coverage does not meet her actual losses.
In the view of this Court, this case represents only one more step in a long
litany of unsuccessful efforts by insurers to dilute statutorily mandated insur-
ance coverages for which separate premiums have been paid.
To permit this defendant to receive premiums for $40,000 in medical expense
loss coverage but to only be liable for $20,000 in losses, when the insured has
suffered a $46,000 loss, would result in an unconscionable windfall to defendant
to which this Court will not be a party. Such form of unjustified enrichment was
neither intended by the Minnesota Legislature in enacting the No-Fault Act nor
has it ever been tolerated by our Supreme Court.
Wasche v. Milbank Mut. Ins. Co., No. 730578 (Minn. 4th Dist. Ct. Apr. 15, 1977).
45. To date, 24 states have enacted no-fault plans that provide for some form of first-
party coverage to insureds. See note 5 supra. No-fault plans can be grouped into three
basic categories. See J. O'CONNELL & R. HENDERSON, TORT LAW, No-FAULT AND BEYOND
278-84 (1975). One plan provides for first-party benefits but places no restriction on the
insured's right to sue in tort. This plan is labelled the "add-on" plan. See id. at 279-81.
The second plan is characterized as the "pure" no-fault plan. While providing for first-
party benefits, this plan prohibits any tort action against a third party up to a specified
dollar amount, which is commonly referred to as the "tort threshold." See id. at 283-84.
The third category is the "modified" plan that retains a modified fault determination. See
id. at 281-82. For a list of states that fall under each of the three no-fault plan categories,
see Note, supra note 5, at 126-27. For the tort threshold requirements of the no-fault
states, see Steenson, No-Fault in a Fault Context: Tort Actions and Section 65B.51 of the
Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act, 2 WM. MITCHELL L. Rav. 109, 162-65
(1976). The tort threshold for medical expenses under the Minnesota Act recently was
raised to $4,000. See Act of Mar. 28, 1978, ch. 711, § 1, 1978 Minn. Laws 681, 681 (amend-
ing MINN. STAT. § 65B.51(3) (1976)).
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premiums," thus less affluent persons may not be able to afford insur-
ance coverage.47 Although unable to afford the increased premium rates,
less affluent motorists may continue to drive their automobiles as a
matter of necessity, even though they are uninsured.5 When an unin-
sured motorist is involved in an accident, however, that person may be
unable to obtain immediate compensation for the injuries sustained. 9
Thus, one of the primary purposes of the Minnesota Act-the prompt
payment of basic economic loss benefits without regard to fault5°-may
be defeated as a result of stacking.
46. See 268 N.W.2d at 919 n.13. The insurance companies in Wasche asserted that
stacking no-fault benefits would increase premium rates. See id. at 919 n.11. This asser-
tion, however, is speculative. The manner in which the no-fault insurance premiums were
calculated rested upon disputed issues of fact and the extent to which the premiums
charged on each additional vehicle accurately reflected a concomitant increase in the
insurer's risk when the number of drivers remained constant in the household. See id.
Thus, the Wasche court determined that stacking was permitted as a matter of legislative
intent under the Minnesota Act without deciding the issue of adequacy of present prem-
ium rates. For a further discussion of the effect of stacking on insurance premium rates,
see notes 169-78 infra and accompanying text.
47. See notes 169-78 infra and accompanying text.
48. Since the passage of the Minnesota Act, however, the number of uninsured motor-
ists has decreased. See note 171 infra.
49. Under the Minnesota Act, payment of basic economic loss benefits to the injured
party normally will be determined according to the priority of payment provision, see
MINN. STAT. § 65B.47 (1978), or through the assigned claims plan, see id. § 65B.64, as
amended by Act of May 25, 1979, ch. 190, § 4, 1979 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 331 (West), "a
gap-closing device designed to provide insurance coverage when there is no plan of security
under which an injured person can make his claim." Steenson, supra note 45, at 118. An
uninsured motorist, however, generally will not be entitled to recover basic economic loss
benefits under the priority of payment provision unless that person is injured while driving
an insured motor vehicle, see MINN. STAT. § 65B.47(4)(b) (1978), or comes within the
commercial vehicle exception. See id. § 65B.47(1)-(3).
Similarly, a person will not be entitled to recover basic economic loss benefits through
the assigned claims plan for injuries sustained, if at the time of the injury the injured
person owned a private passenger vehicle but failed to insure it as is required by the Act.
See id. § 65B.64(3), as amended by Act of May 25, 1979, ch. 190, § 4, 1979 Minn. Sess.
Law Serv. 331 (West). The assigned claims plan also is drafted to prohibit compensating
members of the owner's household who knew or should have known that the owner's
vehicle was uninsured. See id. The Minnesota Supreme Court allowed children of an
uninsured motorist to recover first-party benefits under the assigned claims plan, however,
when the children had no knowledge of the parents' failure to insure. See Kaysen v.
Federal Ins. Co., 268 N.W.2d 920, 926-27 (Minn. 1978). The 1979 Minnesota Legislature
has expressly adopted this position by providing that minor children shall be entitled to
participate in the assigned claims plan even though their parents are not insured. See Act
of May 25, 1979, ch. 190, § 4, 1979 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 331 (West) (amending MINN.
STAT. § 65B.64(3) (1978)).
50. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.42(1) (1978).
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2. Basic Economic Loss Benefits Limited to a Maximum of $30,000
In addition to claiming that stacking was contrary to the purpose
provision of the Minnesota Act,5 the insurers in Wasche maintained.
that the statutory language of section 65B.44 limited recovery of first-
party benefits to a maximum of $30,000.52 The insurers keyed on the
phrase "and shall provide for a maximum of $30,000 for loss arising out
of the injury of any one person," 53 arguing that, based on this phraseol-
ogy, the Legislature intended to prohibit the stacking of no-fault bene-
fits. 5'
In interpreting this language, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that
section 65B.44, subdivision 1 does not preclude stacking but only serves
to define the basic unit of coverage required by the Minnesota Act,55 so
51. 268 N.W.2d at 914-15; see MINN. STAT. § 65B.42 (1978); notes 38-50 supra and
accompanying text.
52. See 268 N.W.2d at 917.
53. MINN. STAT. § 65B.44(1) (1978). The full text of section 65B.44(1) provides:
Basic economic loss benefits shall provide reimbursement for all loss suffered
through injury arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle, subject
to any applicable deductions, exclusions, disqualifications, and other condi-
tions, and shall provide a maximum of $30,000 for loss arising out of the injury
of any one person, consisting of:
(a) $20,000 for medical expense loss arising out of injury to any one person;
and
(b) A total of $10,000 for income loss, replacement services loss, funeral
expense loss, survivor's economic loss, and survivor's replacement services loss
arising out the injury to any one person.
Id. § 65B.44(1) (emphasis added).
54. See 268 N.W.2d at 917.
55. See id. Section 65B.49 enumerates the various types of coverage the insurer must
offer to its insured. The mandatory offer provision of section 65B.49 provides:
On and after January 1, 1975, no insurance policy providing benefits for
injuries arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle shall be issued,
renewed, continued, delivered, issued for delivery, or executed in this state with
respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state unless
coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto, under provisions approved
by the commissioner, requiring the insurer to pay, regardless of the fault of the
insured, basic economic loss benefits.
A plan of reparation security shall state the name and address of the named
insured, the coverage afforded by the policy, the premium charged, the term and
limits of liability, and shall contain an agreement or endorsement that insurance
is provided thereunder in accordance with and subject to the provisions of sec-
tions 65B.41 to 65B.71.
MINN. STAT. § 65B.49(1) (1978).
In addition to providing for a minimum of $30,000 in first-party benefits, each insurance
policy issued in this state must provide the insured with liability coverage in the amounts
of $25,000 per person, $50,000 per accident, and $10,000 for property damage (25/50/10)
and uninsured motorist coverage in the amount of $25,000 per person and $50,000 per
accident (25/50). See id. § 65B.49(3)-(4). The insurer also must offer the insured addi-
tional medical expense benefits and liability coverage benefits over and above the
19791
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that each person injured is entitled to receive a minimum of $30,000 in
first-party benefits, which includes $20,000 for medical expenses and
$10,000 for wage loss, funeral expenses, and other out-of-pocket losses.
5 6
Two arguments support the court's conclusion.
First, section 65B.44, subdivision 1 is a definitional, not an operative,
provision and merely defines basic economic loss benefits. 57 The remain-
ing subdivisions of section 65B.44 merely enumerate the specific losses
and dollar amounts that will be covered by first-party benefits. 58 This
definitional provision therefore should not be construed to address the
stacking question.
Second, an insurance carrier must offer additional first-party benefits
to an insured under section 65B.49, subdivision 6, indicating that the
Legislature did not intend to fix a ceiling on the total dollar amount of
first-party benefits recoverable by an insured.5 9 Subdivision 6 of section
65B.49 provides that an insurer must offer an insured, in addition to the
basic mandatory coverage, optional first-party benefits in the amounts
of $10,000 and $20,000.60 Because additional basic economic loss benefits
amounts required by statute. See id. § 65B.49(6). Finally, the insurer must offer underin-
sured motorist benefits in an amount equal to that of the liability coverage limits or such
lower limits as the insured may select. See id. § 65B.49(6)(e).
56. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.44(1) (1978).
57. See Brief of Amicus Curiae at 14, Wasche v. Milbank Mut. Ins. Co., 268 N.W.2d
913 (Minn. 1978).
58. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.44(2)-(8) (1978), as amended by Act of May 25, 1979, ch.
221, 1979 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 469 (West). For a general discussion of the benefits
section 65B.44 provides, see note 9 supra.
59. When presented with the fixed ceiling argument, the lower court in Bock v. Mutual
Serv. Cas. Ins. Co., No. 734850 (Minn. 4th Dist. Ct. Jan. 9, 1978), succinctly stated:
While the defendant is correct that the provision [section 65B.441 prescribes
a maximum ceiling, the maximum ceiling is that required to be purchased by
the insured under one policy of insurance for one motor vehicle. The court does
not believe that the legislature intended for this provision to impose a $30,000
maximum recovery of economic loss benefits by anyone insured in the situation
where the insured is covered by multiple no-fault insurance policies.
Support for this determination of legislative intent is also found in M.S.A.
65B.49, Subd. 6, which allows an insured to purchase additional optional cover-
ages upon the payment of higher corresponding premiums. It is clear, then, that
the legislature did not intend that an insured be limited to an absolute ceiling
of $30,000 in basic economic loss benefits per accident. In light of this provision
allowing an insured to obtain additional coverage, there is nothing in the Act
which prevents an insured from obtaining such additional coverage through the
purchase of a separate policy of insurance which provides for the same basic
economic loss benefits as outlined in M.S.A. 65B.44.
Id.
60. Subdivision 6 of section 65B.49 provides:
Reparation obligors shall offer the following optional coverages in addition to
compulsory coverages:
(a) Medical expense benefits subject to a maximum payment of $10,000;
(b) Medical expense benefits subject to a maximum payment of $20,000;
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may be purchased under section 65B.49, subdivision 6, the word
"maximum"'" does not place an absolute ceiling on the amount of first-
party benefits recoverable by an accident victim.
As additional support for its conclusion that the word "maximum"
does not place an absolute ceiling on the amount of first-party benefits
recoverable, the Wasche court cited with approval"2 the recent Nevada
Supreme Court decision of Travelers Insurance Co. v. Lopez,63 which
held that basic reparation benefits could be stacked. The pertinent
wording of the Nevada Motor Vehicle Insurance Act (Nevada Act),64
similar to that of the Minnesota Act, stated that first-party benefits are
"not to exceed $10,000 per person per accident.""5 The insurers in Lopez
contended that this language, when read in conjunction with the defini-
tion of basic reparation benefits"6 and the "priority among insurers"
(c) Residual bodily liability coverage of not less than $25,000 for damages
for injury to one person in any one accident arising out of the maintenance or
use of a motor vehicle, subject to a limitation of $50,000 for damages arising out
of any one accident;
(d) Basic economic loss benefits to all persons purchasing liability coverage
for injuries arising out of the maintenance or use of a motorcycle;
(e) Underinsured motorist coverage offered in an amount at least equal to
the insured's residual liability limits and also at lower limits which the insured
may select, whereby the reparation obligor agrees to pay damages the insured
is legally entitled to recover on account of a motor vehicle accident but which
are uncompensated because the total damages exceed the residual bodily injury
liability limit of the owner of the other vehicle. The reparation obligor is subro-
gated to any amounts it pays and upon payment has an assignment of the
judgment if any against the other person to the extent of the money it pays; and
(f) Uninsured motorist coverage in addition to the minimum limits specified
in subdivision 4, so as to provide total limits of uninsured motorist coverage
equal to the residual bodily injury liability limits of the policy, or smaller limits
as the insured may select. This coverage may be offered in combination with
the coverage under clause (e).
MINN. STAT. § 65B.49(6) (1978).
61. See id. § 65B.44(1).
62. See 268 N.W.2d at 918.
63. 93 Nev. 463, 567 P.2d 471 (1977).
64. See Act of Apr. 24, 1973, ch. 530, 1973 Nev. Stats. 822 (repealed 1979).
65. Id. § 8, 1973 Nev. Stats. at 823. The Minnesota Act has similar language. Compare
id. (benefits payable are not to exceed $10,000 per person) with MINN. STAT. § 65B.44(1)
(1978) (basic economic loss benefits shall provide a maximum of $30,000 for loss arising
out of an injury to any one person).
66. The definition of "basic reparation benefits" under the Nevada act provides:
1. "Basic reparation benefits" means the net benefits payable for injury arising
out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle.
2. "Basic reparation benefits" do not include benefits for harm to property.
Act of Apr. 24, 1973, ch. 530, § 5, 1973 Nev. Stats. 822, 823 (repealed 1979). Under the
Nevada Act, net benefits payable are equivalent to basic economic loss benefits under the
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provision of the Nevada Act, 7 limited recovery of basic reparation bene-
fits under all applicable policies to a total of $10,000.8 Stating that the
Nevada Legislature did not intend to prohibit stacking," the Nevada
court stressed that the availability of additional first-party benefits
under the Nevada Act" undercut the insurance companies' argument
that the Legislature intended to limit recovery of basic reparation bene-
fits to a maximum of $10,000 per accident." Thus, the court permitted
the stacking of first-party benefits to the extent of the actual loss.
In summary, the statutory interpretation by the Wasche court, stat-
ing that a "maximum of $30,000 for loss arising out of the injury of any
one person"" does not necessarily place an absolute ceiling on basic
economic loss benefits when more than one policy is applicable, 73 is
67. The priority provision of the Nevada Act provided:
If two or more obligations to pay basic reparation benefits are applicable to an
injury under the priorities set out in this section, benefits are payable only once
and the reparation obligor against whom a claim is asserted shall process and
pay the claim as if wholly responsible.
Act of Apr. 24, 1973, ch. 530, § 26(4), 1973 Nev. Stats. 822, 827 (repealed 1979). The
Minnesota Act has a comparable provision. Compare id. (benefits are payable only once)
with MINN. STAT. § 65B.47(5) (1978) (benefits are payable only once).
68. See 93 Nev. at 465, 567 P.2d at 472.
69. See id. at 466, 567 P.2d at 473.
70. The optional reparation benefits provision of the Nevada Act provided:
Basic reparation insurers shall offer such additional optional coverage for added
reparation benefits as may be required by regulations promulgated by the com-
missioner of insurance. Added reparation benefits shall include without limita-
tion:
1. Benefits payable in excess of the limitations provided in NRS
698.070.
2. Collision and upset damage.
Act of Apr. 24, 1973, ch. 530, § 36, 1973 Nev. Stats. 822, 831 (repealed 1979). The Nevada
Act is similar to the Minnesota Act in that both require the insurer to offer first-party
benefits in amounts over and above the basic unit of coverage required by statute.
Compare id. (additional optional coverage must be offered) with MINN. STAT. § 65B.49(6)
(1978) (reparation obligors must offer optional coverage in addition to compulsory cover-
ages)..
71. In discussing the availability of optional coverage under the Nevada Act, the Ne-
vada Supreme Court stated:
Legislative intent supportive of our determination is further reflected in that
provision is made to the end that insurers can provide 'additional optional
coverage for added reparation benefits.' NRS 698.360. This section has a chilling
effect on Travelers' contention that it was the intent of the Legislature to limit
the recovery of basic reparation damages to $10,000 per accident. Although
arguendo, the additional reparation benefits contemplated by NRS 698.360 are
to be provided only upon the payment of higher corresponding premiums, there
is nothing preventing the securing of additional reparation benefits through the
purchase of a separate policy of insurance providing for the same basic repara-
tion benefits.
93 Nev. at 466, 567 P.2d at 473 (emphasis in original).
72. MINN. STAT. § 65B.44(1) (1978).
73. See 268 N.W.2d at 917.
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supported by sound rationale. Whereas section 65B.44 merely lists the
basic economic loss benefits provided under each unit of coverage with-
out reference to multiple units of coverage," section 65B.49, subdivision
6 provides that optional first-party benefits may be purchased in addi-
tion to the basic unit of coverage set out in section 65B.44, subdivision
1.71 Thus both section 65B.44, subdivision 1 and section 65B.49, subdivi-
sion 6 can be given a meaningful interpretation only if the term
"maximum" as used in subdivision 1 of section 65B.44 is limited to the
basic unit of coverage relating to one automobile. Taken together, the
two provisions clearly support the court's conclusion that the Legisla-
ture did not intend to prohibit the stacking of first-party, benefits.
3. Express Prohibition of Stacking
After concluding that the language "a maximum of $30,000" only
served to define the basic unit of coverage required by the Minnesota
Act and did not address the stacking question," the Wasche court con-
sidered the "priority of benefits" provision under the Minnesota Act, 77
which provides that if two or more obligations to pay basic economic loss
benefits are applicable to an injury, "benefits are payable only once. ' '71
The insurance carriers in Wasche contended that this language ex-
pressly precluded the injured person from recovering first-party benefits
in excess of one policy limit. 9 Unpersuaded by this argument, the Min-
nesota court held that the "benefits are payable only once" language of
section 65B.47, subdivision 5 was intended merely to prevent double
74. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.44 (1978), as amended by Act of May 25, 1979, ch. 221, 1979
Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 469 (West); note 58 supra and accompanying text.
75. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.49(6) (1978); note 55 supra and accompanying text.
76. See 268 N.W.2d at 917; notes 51-75 supra and accompanying text.
77. See 268 N.W.2d at 917.
78. MINN. STAT. § 65B.47(5) (1978). The priority of benefits provision provides:
If two or more obligations to pay basic economic loss benefits are applicable
to an injury under the priorities set out in this section, benefits are payable only
once and the reparation obligor against whom a claim is asserted shall process
and pay the claim as if wholly responsible, but he is thereafter entitled to recover
contribution pro rata for the basic economic loss benefits paid and the costs of
processing the claim. Where contribution is sought among reparation obligors
responsible under subdivision 4, clause (c), proration shall be based on the
number of involved motor vehicles.
Id. (emphasis added). For a general discussion on contribution and indemnity, see Note,
Contribution and Indemnity-An Examination of the Upheaval in Minnesota Tort Loss
Allocation Concepts, 5 WM. MrrCHELL L. REv. 109 (1979).
79. See 268 N.W.2d at 917. The insurers contended that the phrase "benefits are pay-
able only once" is unambiguous, see Appellant's Brief and Appendix at 11, Wasche v.
Milbank Mut. Ins. Co., 268 N.W.2d 913 (Minn. 1978), citing the general rule of construc-
tion, if the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for statutory
interpretation. See, e.g., Minnesota-St. Paul Sanitary Dist. v. City of St. Paul, 240 Minn.
434, 437, 61 N.W.2d 533, 535-36 (1953).
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recovery for the same elements of loss and, further, to prorate that loss
among multiple insurers on the same priority level.so The Wasche court
arrived at this conclusion through an examination of both the Uniform
Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act (UMVARA)5 ' and the
Travelers Insurance Co. v. Lopez decision. 2
When the Minnesota Legislature enacted section 65B.47, subdivision
5 of the Minnesota Act, it adopted verbatim the language of the UM-
VARA priority provision.8 3 Under UMVARA an injured victim is enti-
tled to unlimited medical benefits,84 making stacking unnecessary to
recoup actual losses. Because the stacking of first-party benefits will
never arise under UMVARA, the UMVARA priority provision merely is
intended to prevent double recovery and to prorate those losses among
multiple insurers on the same priority level. Therefore the Minnesota
Legislature's verbatim adoption of the language of UMVARA in enact-
ing section 65B.47, subdivision 5 of the Minnesota Act cannot be said
to be indicative of a legislative intent to prohibit stacking. Instead, as
the Wasche court reasoned, the purpose of the priority provision is to
prevent duplicate recovery for the same elements of loss85 and to appor-
80. See 268 N.W.2d at 918.
81. See UNIFORM MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT REPARATIONS ACT, §§ 1-47 [hereinafter cited
as UMVARA]; notes 83-86 infra and accompanying text.
82. 93 Nev. 463, 567 P.2d 471 (1977); see notes 87-91 infra and accompanying text.
83. The priority provision of UMVARA provides:
If two or more obligations to pay basic reparation benefits are applicable to
an injury under the priorities set out in this section, benefits are payable only
once and the reparation obligor against whom a claim is asserted shall process
and pay the claim as if wholly responsible, but he is thereafter entitled to recover
contribution pro rata for the basic reparation benefits paid and the costs of
processing the claim. Where contribution is sought among reparation obligors
responsible under paragraph (3) of subsection (c) proration shall be based on
the number of involved motor vehicles.
UMVARA § 4(d). Except for UMVARA's use of the words "basic reparation benefits,"
rather than "basic economic loss benefits" as used in the Minnesota Act, the substantive
language of the two statutes is identical. Compare id. with MINN. STAT. § 65B.47(5) (1978).
84. Under UMVARA an insured is entitled to payment of all reasonable medical and
rehabilitative expenses without limit. See UMVARA, Commissioners' Prefatory Note. For
the particular no-fault states that provide for unlimited medical expenses, see MICH.
COMp. LAWS ANN. § 500.3107 (West Cum. Supp. 1978 & 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-
4(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1978); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1009.202(a) (Purdon Cum. Supp.
1978).
85. The argument that "benefits are payable only once" expressly prohibits stacking
of basic economic loss benefits was initially raised by Milbank Mutual in the lower court
proceedings. The court rejected the assertion stating:
This provision [section 65B.47(5)] does not address, much less preclude, the
stacking of basic economic loss benefits where the insured is covered under more
than one policy and the actual basic economic losses exceed the coverage pro-
vided under one policy.
Subd. 5 simply prevents an insured from recovering benefits in excess of his
losses by providing that benefits are payable only once, and further provides for
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tion those losses among the insurance carriers. 6
The court also relied on the Lopez decision in interpreting section
65B.47, subdivision 5.17 In Lopez the Nevada Supreme Court was pre-
sented with the identical issue concerning the construction of its no-
fault insurance act.88 The language set out in the priority section of the
Nevada Act also stated that "benefits are payable only once."" The
insurance carriers in Lopez contended that this language clearly prohib-
ited the stacking of multiple insurance coverages when both insurers
were on the same priority level."0 The Nevada Supreme Court con-
cluded, however, that the priority provision of the Nevada Act simply
was intended to limit the payment of basic reparation benefits to a
single priority level rather than to prohibit the stacking of multiple
insurance coverages."
the pro rata sharing of the payment of those benefits where there is more than
one reparations obligor obligated to pay them.
Thus, where two separately paid premiums give rise to separate obligations
to pay, this section [section 65B.47(5)] permits the basic economic loss benefits
to be stacked, but only up to the amount of the insured's basic economic losses.
Wasche v. Milbank Mut. Ins. Co., No. 730578 (Minn. 4th Dist. Ct. Apr. 15, 1977).
86. Section 65B.47, subdivision 5 of the Minnesota Act merely incorporates the common
insurance technique of prorating losses among the at-fault carriers so that no double
recovery is received for the same loss. See 268 N.W.2d at 918. For example, assume that
a person owns two automobiles and has them insured by separate insurance carriers. If
the insured is in an accident and sustains $30,000 in medical expenses, the insurance
carriers would prorate the loss between themselves; each would be responsible for payment
of $15,000 for a combined total of $30,000. In the above illustration, the insured was
compensated in full for the economic loss without exceeding the policy limits of the
individual insurance coverages-$20,000. If stacking were not permitted and the insured
was limited to the coverage under one policy-$20,000-he would not have been compen-
sated in full for his economic loss; yet, the insurers would have been permitted to prorate
the limits of one policy coverage. Thus, each carrier only would have been responsible for
$10,000, with neither carrier exhausting the limits of its policy coverage. Hence, the
insurance carriers would have received an unearned windfall on the premiums paid be-
cause the insured was required to maintain coverage on each vehicle owned but was not
entitled to receive the full benefits of the individual policies.
87. See 268 N.W.2d at 918.
88. See 93 Nev. at 464, 567 P.2d at 472.
89. See Act of Apr. 24, 1973, ch. 530, § 26(4), 1973 Nev. Stats. 822, 827 (repealed 1979).
For the full text of the priority provision, see note 67 supra.
90. See 93 Nev. at 465, 567 P.2d at 472-73.
91. See id. at 466-67, 567 P.2d at 473. In permitting first-party benefits to be stacked,
the Lopez court said:
[Tihere exists no legislative prohibition against the "stacking" of insurance
policies when both insurers are at the same level of priority, as is the case here.
There are public policy and other considerations which support this conclusion.
For example, the insured Lopez, paid premiums on two policies of insurance
covering the same vehicle. Both policies of insurance provided for the payment
of basic reparation benefits. Injuries and expenses sustained by the insured are
in excess of $20,000. Requiring the payment by Travelers of the policy limit
would not result in a windfall to Lopez, nor would it result in any prejudice to
1979]
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Thus, relying on the historical background of the UMVARA priority
provision and the rationale of the Lopez decision,"2 the Wasche court's
resolution of the stacking issue is based on sound principles and ration-
ale. In concluding that basic economic loss benefits may be stacked,"
the Wasche court cogently reasoned that the "benefits are payable only
once" language found in subdivision 5 of section 65B.47 merely was
intended to prevent double recovery for the same elements of loss and
to prorate the loss among insurance carriers. 4
B. Uninsured Motorist Decisions
In addition to the statutory construction argument, the Wasche court
was persuaded by the rationale of its earlier decisions permitting the
stacking of uninsured motorist coverage. 5 The court stressed two simi-
the insurance company, in that the insurance company has accepted the pay-
ment of premiums and has, in effect, assumed the risk that injury to the insured
may occur. The premiums collected by Travelers are deemed to have compre-
hended this potential.
Id.
92. See notes 81-91 supra and accompanying text.
93. See 268 N.W.2d at 918. The Georgia Court of Appeals recently held that no-fault
benefits could not be stacked even though the insured had not been fully compensated
for his actual losses. See Georgia Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Waters, 146 Ga. App. 149, 153-54,
246 S.E.2d 202, 206 (1978). The court's denial of stacking first-party benefits in Waters,
however, is easily distinguishable from the Wasche decision. First, Georgia has an
automobile-related plan in which insurance coverage follows the car rather than a person-
related plan as Minnesota has under its no-fault statute. Compare id. at 152-53, 246
S.E.2d at 205 with Wasche v. Milbank Mut. Ins. Co., 268 N.W.2d 913, 916 (Minn. 1978).
Consequently, if a person is injured while occupying another vehicle or is injured while a
pedestrian then that person must look to the insurance carrier of the other automobile
and not to his own insurance carrier to recover first-party benefits. See GA. CODE ANN. §
56-3402(b) (1977). Second, the Georgia Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act
[hereinafter cited as Georgia No-Fault Act] clearly and unambiguously prohibits the
stacking of first-party benefits when more than one policy is available. The antistacking
provision of the Georgia statute reads as follows:
The total benefits required to be paid under this section without regard to fault
as the result of any one accident shall not exceed the sum of $5,000 per each
individual covered as an insured person or such greater amount of coverage as
had been purchased on an optional basis as provided elsewhere in this Chapter,
regardless of the number of insurers providing such benefits or of the number
of policies providing such coverage.
GA. CODE ANN. § 56-3403b (1977) (emphasis added). The Georgia No-Fault Act, then,
expressly prohibits the stacking of first-party benefits, unlike the Minnesota Act which
does not have a comparable antistacking provision. See Wasche v. Milbank Mut. Ins. Co.,
268 N.W.2d 913, 919 n.12 (Minn. 1978).
94. See 268 N.W.2d at 918.
95. See id. The Minnesota Supreme Court first announced its approval of the stacking
concept in the landmark cases of Van Tassel v. Horace Mann Mut. Ins. Co., 296 Minn.
181, 207 N.W.2d 348 (1973) and Pleitgen v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 296 Minn. 191, 207
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larities between the Minnesota Act and the uninsured motorist statute. 
9
First, no-fault insurance was adopted at a time when stacking multiple
coverages was the recognized rule in the context of uninsured motorist
insurance. 7 Second, the court noted that both statutes compelled the
vehicle owner to maintain coverage on each vehicle owned, the insured
paying an additional premium for each vehicle covered." Thus, unable
to find a material distinction between the cases construing the unin-
sured motorist statute and cases involving no-fault insurance, the
Wasche court indicated that the similarities between the two statutes
were indicative of a legislative intent to allow the stacking of basic
economic loss benefits under the Minnesota Act. 9
The former Minnesota uninsured motorist statute has since been repealed and reen-
acted as part of the Minnesota Act. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.49(4) (1978). The statute in
effect at the time of Van Tassel required the insurers to offer uninsured motorist coverage
and provided as follows:
No automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance insuring
against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death
suffered by any person arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a
motor vehicle shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this state with respect
to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state unless cover-
age is provided therein or supplemental thereto, under provisions approved by
the commissioner of insurance, for the protection of persons insured thereunder
who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of unin-
sured motor vehicles, including colliding motor vehicles whose operators or own-
ers are unknown or are unidentifiable at the time of the accident, and whose
identity does not become known thereafter, because of bodily injury, sickness
or disease, including death, resulting therefrom; provided that the named in-
sured shall have the right to reject in writing such coverage; and provided
further that, unless the named insured requests such coverage in writing, such
coverage need not be provided in or supplemental to a renewal policy where the
named insured had rejected the coverage in connection with a policy previously
issued to him by the same insurer. The policy limits of the coverage required to
be offered by this section shall be as set forth in Minnesota Statutes 1965,
Section 170.25, Subdivision 3, until January 1, 1971; thereafter, at the option
of the insured, the uninsured motorist coverage shall be equal to those provided
in the policy of bodily injury liability insurance of the insured or such lesser
limits as the insured elects to carry.
Act of May 24, 1967, ch. 837, § 1, 1967 Minn. Laws 1735 (current version at MINN. STAT.
§ 65B.49(4) (1978)).
96. See 268 N.W.2d at 918-19.
97. See id. at 918; notes 100-02 infra and accompanying text.
98. See 268 N.W.2d at 918-19; notes 103-15 infra and accompanying text.
99. See 268 N.W.2d at 919. Other no-fault states, faced with similar stacking questions,
have denied stacking on the basis of antistacking provisions either within the statute itself
or within the insurance policy, the language being clear and unambiguous. See, e.g., State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Kilbreath, 362 So. 2d 474 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Travelers
Indem. Co. v. Wolfson, 348 So. 2d 661 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Chappelear v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 347 So. 2d 477 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Castaneda, 339 So. 2d 679 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976), appeal dismissed, 359 So. 2d 1211
(Fla. 1978); Georgia Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Waters, 146 Ga. App. 149, 246 S.E.2d 202 (1978);
19791
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1. Stacking of Uninsured Motorist Benefits
In permitting first-party benefits to be stacked, the Wasche court
reasoned that if the Legislature had intended to prohibit stacking it
would have done so expressly. 00 Because the Legislature was aware that
the stacking of uninsured motorist coverage was permitted, the court
stated that the Legislature would have provided for an antistacking
provision under the Minnesota Act if it had intended such a prohibi-
tion.'0' Moreover, the Minnesota Legislature in 1978 rejected an anti-
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Benton, 278 Md. 542, 365 A.2d 1000 (1976); Southwestern Ins. Co. v.
Winn, 274 Or. 695, 548 P.2d 1311 (1976); Guerrero v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 575 S.W.2d
323 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
100. See 268 N.W.2d at 919. Stacking of personal injury protection benefits also has
been litigated in a number of lower courts in Florida. In State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
v. Castaneda, 339 So. 2d 679 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976), appeal dismissed, 359 So. 2d 1211
(Fla. 1978), the District Court of Appeals held that first-party benefits could not be
stacked even though Florida permitted uninsured motorist benefits to be stacked. Unlike
the uninsured motorist provision of the Florida Statutes, the Florida Automobile Repara-
tions No-Fault Reform Act [hereinafter cited as Florida No-Fault Act] expressly author-
izes the insurer to limit the coverage of first-party benefits. See 339 So. 2d at 680-81. The
court also held that because the insurance policy was clear and unambiguous, it was
unnecessary to interpret the insurance contract. See id. at 681. In the second of Florida's
four stacking cases, another district court denied the stacking of first-party benefits when
the insured had a single policy covering two vehicles. In Chappelear v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
347 So. 2d 477 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977), the court cited with approval the Castaneda
decision and concluded that a different result is not warranted simply because a single
policy covering two vehicles was in effect as opposed to Castaneda in which each vehicle
was insured by a separate policy. See id. at 478. The court in Travelers Indem. Co. v.
Wolfson, 348 So. 2d 661 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977), also held that basic economic loss
benefits could not be stacked beyond the minimum coverage allowed in the Florida No-
Fault Act. See id. at 662-63. In the most recent Florida decision, State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Kilbreath, 362 So. 2d 474 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), the Florida District Court
of Appeals held that personal injury protection benefits from four separate policies could
not be stacked. In reversing the trial court decision, the Kilbreath court stated that the
insurance policy and statutory provisions clearly and unambiguously prohibited stacking.
See id. at 475.
The Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in Wasche to permit stacking can be distin-
guished from the Florida decisions. According to the Florida No-Fault Act, first-party
benefits follow the car. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.736(2)(a) (West 1972 & Cum. Supp.
1979). Thus, coverage is attributable to a specific automobile. Under the Minnesota Act,
however, coverage follows the insured rather than the car, see MiNN. STAT. § 65B.47(4)(a)
(1978), unless the insured is injured by a commercial vehicle. In that instance, the insurer
of the commercial vehicle would be responsible for primary coverage rather than the
injured party's own insurance carrier. See id. § 65B.47(1)-(3).
101. See 268 N.W.2d at 919. The Georgia Supreme Court, in State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 226 Ga. 710, 177 S.E.2d 257 (1970), held that uninsured motorist
coverages could be stacked, see id. at 713-15, 177 S.E.2d at 260, while in Georgia Cas. &
Sur. Co. v. Waters, 146 Ga. App. 149, 246 S.E.2d 202 (1978), the Georgia Court of Appeals
held that first-party benefits under its no-fault statute could not be stacked. The Waters
court distinguished the uninsured motorist decisions on the basis that the no-fault statute
expressed a legislative intent to prohibit the stacking of first-party benefits that was not
[Vol. 5
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stacking bill that would have conclusively denied the stacking of first-
party benefits. 02 Therefore, the Legislature's failure to provide for an
antistacking provision at a time when the stacking of uninsured motorist
insurance was permitted and its recent rejection of an antistacking bill,
clearly support the court's reasoning that the Legislature did not intend
to prohibit stacking.
2. Mandatory Coverage
A second reason set forth by the Wasche court in support of stacking
first-party benefits is that both the no-fault and the uninsured motorist
statutes require an owner of a motor vehicle to maintain insurance cov-
erage on each vehicle.0 3 Proponents of the "mandatory coverage argu-
present in the uninsured motorist cases. See id. at 153, 246 S.E.2d at 206. For a discussion
of the distinctions between the Georgia No-Fault Act and the Minnesota Act, see note 93
supra.
102. See H.F. 1707, § 2, 70th Minn. Legis., 1978 Sess. (1978), reprinted in Wasche v.
Milbank Mut. Ins. Co., 268 N.W.2d 913, 919 n.12 (Minn. 1978). The language of the
proposed amendment would have provided:
If two or more insurance policies covering basic economic loss benefits are in
force, the amount of recovery shall not exceed the amount which could be
recovered in basic economic loss benefits under one policy. The existence of two
or more insurance policies covering basic economic loss benefits shall not in-
crease the amount of recovery for basic economic loss benefits beyond that
provided by one insurance policy.
Id.
103. See 268 N.W.2d at 918-19. In addition to the mandatory coverage argument, the
Minnesota court also relied on an unconscionability argument in its uninsured motorist
decisions. See, e.g., Van Tassel v. Horace Mann Mut. Ins. Co., 296 Minn. 181, 187, 207
N.W.2d 348, 351-52 (1973). Similar to the reasoning of the mandatory coverage argument,
the unconscionability argument emphasizes the windfall to the insurer if stacking is
denied. The gist of this argument is that to permit the insurers to collect a premium and
to then avoid full payment of the loss because of the pro rata provision contained in their
insurance policies would be unconscionable. In the context of no-fault automobile insur-
ance, the Minnesota Supreme Court in Wasche did not rely on the unconscionability
argument in reaching its decision, indicating instead that stacking was decided as a
matter of legislative intent. See 268 N.W.2d at 919 n.11. The court noted that the manner
in which no-fault premiums were calculated rested upon disputed issues of fact. See id.
Mutual Service, one of the insurers in the Wasche case, asserted in the lower court
proceedings that the stacking of first-party benefits was not necessary to prevent an
unearned premium windfall to the insurer in the no-fault context:
[Tihe separately stated premiums on two policies reflect the increase of risk
to the insured of having two vehicles on the highways. Obviously, two vehicles
represent a greater risk than one does, and members of a two-car family are more
likely to be injured than members of a one-car family, simply because they are
out on the road more. (To the extent the risk is less than doubled, the multiple
vehicle discount given here accommodates that.) For this reason it is necessary
to charge separate premiums for basic economic loss coverages for the separate
vehicles. Put another way, the separate premiums on separate policies are for
the increased breadth of coverage occasioned by the increased risk. But they in
no way pay for the increased depth of coverage which plaintiff claims to be
1979]
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ment" contend that to deny stacking in this instance will result in an
insurer "diluting" its coverage below the statutory minimum as set forth
by the Minnesota Legislature in section 65B.44, subdivision 1.101 The
insurance carriers, on the other hand, assert that the pro rata provision
of the "other insurance" clause 5 contained in the insurance contract
entitled to. Such increased depth of coverage is paid for by the extra premium
charged for optional coverages in excess of the statutory minimums.
Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and in
Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 6-7, Bock v. Mutual Serv. Cas.
Ins. Co., No. 734850 (Minn. 4th Dist. Ct. Jan. 9, 1978) (emphasis in original). Therefore,
the insurers argued that the additional premium is consideration for the increased breadth
of coverage rather than for the increased depth of coverage.
The better reasoning, however, would reach just the opposite conclusion; the addition
of a second vehicle to a household does not necessarily result in an increased risk exposure
to the insurance carrier. Unless permitted to stack first-party benefits, the insured would
receive no value for the second premium. Two principal arguments mitigate the increased
risk exposure theory. First, no-fault insurance is first-party insurance and is personal in
nature; the named insured and his insureds are entitled to first-party benefits regardless
of which vehicle they are driving, riding in, or injured by. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.47(4)(a)
(1978). Therefore, the risk of injury is the same to the insureds whether they have one
vehicle or two vehicles. Second, there are numerous ways in which an insured may be
involved in an accident yet still be entitled to coverage under his own no-fault policy. For
example, an insured could be struck by another vehicle while bicycling, while crossing the
street as a pedestrian, or while occupying or driving another vehicle. In all of these
instances the insured would look to his own policy first for coverage because basic eco-
nomic loss benefits follow the insured, not the vehicle. But see MINN. STAT. § 65B.47(1)-
(3) (1978) (insurer of commercial vehicle has primary responsibility). Consequently, the
risk exposure to an insured and his family is not significantly greater if multiple vehicles
are owned than if just one vehicle is owned because a person can be injured in a number
of different ways that have no relationship to the number of vehicles owned.
Thus, the extra premium the insured pays for having an additional motor vehicle in the
household is not justifiable on the basis that it is consideration for the concomitant
increase in risk exposure due to there being another vehicle on the highway. Unless
allowed to stack first-party benefits, the insured would be paying a second premium
without gaining a corresponding benefit from such payment. This would result in a wind-
fall to the insurer in the form of an unearned premium, clearly in derogation of the
principles enunciated by the Minnesota Supreme Court in its uninsured motorist deci-
sions. See Van Tassel v. Horace Mann Mut. Ins. Co., 296 Minn. 181, 187, 207 N.W.2d
348, 351-52 (1973).
104. To illustrate the "dilution" argument, assume that B owns two automobiles that
are insured by the same insurance carrier under separate policies and for which separate
premiums have been paid. B is involved in an accident sustaining $30,000 in medical
expenses. If the court were to adopt the rationale of the insurance carrier, B only would
recover $20,000 out of the $30,000 that was incurred in medical expenses even though he
would have been compensated in full if allowed to stack the policies. The insurance carrier
would argue that it has not "diluted" the statutorily mandated insurance coverage under
the Act because B did receive $20,000 for his medical expenses-the amount payable
under one policy.
105. The pro rata provision becomes operative when an insured owns two or more
vehicles or is an insured under two or more policies. The standard language used in the
"other insurance" clause generally provides as follows:
[Vol. 5
22
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [1979], Art. 4
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol5/iss2/4
STACKING OF NO-FAULT BENEFITS
expressly prohibits the stacking of basic economic loss benefits, limiting
an insurer's liability to the coverage available under a single insurance
policy regardless of the number of vehicles involved. 06
No eligible injured person shall recover duplicate benefits for the same elements
of loss under this or any similar insurance including self-insurance. In the event
the eligible injured person has other similar insurance including self-insurance
available and applicable to the accident, the maximum recovery under all such
insurance shall not exceed the amount which would have been payable under
the provisions of the insurance providing the highest dollar limit, and the Com-
pany shall not be liable for a greater proportion of any loss to which this coverage
applies than the limit of liability hereunder bears to the sum of the applicable
limits of liability of this coverage and such other insurance.
E.g., Wasche v. Milbank Mut. Ins. Co., 268 N.W.2d 913, 916 n.3 (Minn. 1978). Eightee,
states have rejected the pro rata clause in the analogous context of uninsured motorist
cases, holding that the insured could stack multiple uninsured motorist coverages. See
Arkansas: Woolston v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 306 F. Supp. 738, 741-42 (W.D. Ark.
1969); Connecticut: Pecker v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 171 Conn. 443, 452, 370 A.2d 1006,
1010 (1976); Georgia: State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 226 Ga. 710, 713-14,
177 S.E.2d 257, 260 (1970); Illinois: Squire v. Economy Fire & Cas. Co., 69 Ill. 2d 167,
180-81, 370 N.E.2d 1044, 1049-50 (1977); Kansas: Van Hoozer v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 219
Kan. 595, 608-10, 549 P.2d 1354, 1365-66 (1976); Kentucky: State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. McNutt, 494 F.2d 1282, 1283 (6th Cir. 1974); Louisiana: Phillips v. Barraza, 320
So. 2d 587 (La. Ct. App. 1975); Michigan: Detroit Auto. Inter.-Ins. Exch. v. Ayvazian, 62
Mich. App. 94, 99-100, 233 N.W.2d 200, 202-03 (1975); Minnesota: Van Tassel v. Horace
Mann Mut. Ins. Co., 296 Minn. 181, 187, 207 N.W.2d 348, 351-52 (1973); Mississippi:
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Bishop, 329 So. 2d 670, 672 (Miss. 1976); Missouri:
Galloway v. Farmers Ins. Co., 523 S.W.2d 339 (Mo. App. 1975); Nebraska: Bose v. Ameri-
can Family Mut. Ins. Co., 186 Neb. 209, 181 N.W.2d 839 (1970); North Carolina: Moore
v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. Group, 270 N.C. 532, 543-44, 155 S.E.2d 128, 136 (1967); Okla-
homa: Keel v. MFA Ins. Co., 553 P.2d 153, 155-56 (Okla. 1976); Oregon: Smith v. Pacific
Auto Ins. Co., 240 Or. 167, 171, 400 P.2d 512, 514-15 (1965); South Carolina: Boyd v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 260 S.C. 316, 319-21, 195 S.E.2d 706, 707-08 (1973); Vermont:
Goodrich v. Lumbermans Mut. Cas. Co., 423 F. Supp. 838, 843 (D. Vt. 1976); Washington:
Cammel v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 86 Wash. 2d 264, 543 P.2d 634 (1975).
The five states that have upheld the pro rata clause as not being repugnant to uninsured
motorist legislation include: California: Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Koch, 11 Cal. App. 3d
1019, 90 Cal. Rptr. 280 (1970); Delaware: Sammons v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 267 A.2d
608, 609-10 (Del. Super. Ct. 1970); Florida: Morrison Assurance Co. v. Polak, 230 So. 2d
6 (Fla. 1969); Ohio: Ray v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 550 F.2d 1065 (6th Cir. 1977);
Utah: Martin v. Christensen, 22 Utah 2d 415, 454 P.2d 294 (1969).
106. Mutual Service, one of the insurers in the Wasche case, had maintained that the
"other insurance" provision in its policy expressly prohibited stacking. See Wasche v.
Milbank Mut. Ins. Co., 268 N.W.2d 913, 915-16 (Minn. 1978). The Minnesota Supreme
Court summarily held, however, that a clause in an insurance policy purporting to pro-
hibit the stacking of first-party benefits, for which separate premiums have been paid, is
against public policy and void as repugnant to the statute. See id. at 920. The supreme
court, in so holding, again looked to the rationale of its uninsured motorist decisions in
reaching that conclusion. See id.
In the uninsured motorist context, numerous states have concluded that the "other
insurance" clause is repugnant to public policy. The most influential decision in this area
is the landmark case of Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co., 219 Or. 110, 341 P.2d
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If the insurance carriers' argument is accepted, then if an insured,
owns two automobiles, both of which are covered by the same insurer,
the injured party would receive only the amount payable under one
policy. Although this outcome may appear consistent with the provi-
sions of section 65B.44, subdivision 1(a) requiring $20,000 in first-party
medical benefits, the insured may remain uncompensated when the
losses exceed the limits of one policy coverage." 7 Thus, if an injured
party owns two automobiles that are insured by different insurance
carriers for which separate premiums have been paid, the two compa-
nies would apportion the medical expenses of one policy limit between
themselves. Assuming $20,000 of medical loss benefits are available
110 (1959). Recognizing the absurdity of attempting to apply the provisions of the other
insurance clause logically, the Oregon Supreme Court stated:
The "other insurance" clauses of all policies are but methods used by insurers
to limit their liability, whether using language that relieves them from all liabil-
ity (usually referred to as an "escape clause") or that used by St. Paul (usually
referred to as an "excess clause") or that used by Oregon (usually referred to as
a "prorata clause"). In our opinion, whether one policy uses one clause or an-
other, when any come in conflict with the "other insurance" clause of another
insurer, regardless of the nature of the clause, they are in fact repugnant and
each should be rejected in toto.
Id. at 129, 341 P.2d at 119.
The Minnesota Supreme Court recently was asked to struggle "with the war of seman-
tics among insurance companies" and determine whether the insurance policy containing
the "excess" clause or the insurance policy containing the "escape" clause provided the
primary coverage. In Western Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 269
N.W.2d 34, 36-37 (Minn. 1978), the court imposed liability upon the insurance policy
containing the "escape" clause in the absence of any clear and unambiguous provision to
the contrary.
The first paragraph of the other insurance clause commonly is referred to as the "excess-
escape" clause while the second paragraph commonly is referred to as the "pro rata"
clause. The language of the other insurance clause as used by the insurance industry
typically reads:
With respect to bodily injury to an insured while occupying a highway vehicle
not owned by the named insured, this insurance shall apply only as excess
insurance over any other similar insurance available to such insured and ap-
plicable to such vehicle as primary insurance, and this insurance shall then
apply only in the amount by which the limit of liability for this coverage exceeds
the applicable limit of liability of such other insurance.
Except as provided in the foregoing paragraph, if the insured has other similar
insurance available to him and applicable to the accident, the damages shall
be deemed not to exceed the higher of the applicable limits of liability of this
insurance and such other insurance, and the company shall not be liable for a
greater proportion of any loss to which this coverage applies than the limit of
liability hereunder bears to the sum of the applicable limits of liability of this
insurance and such other insurance.
The Standard Uninsured Motorist Endorsements § E (1966 Standard Form), reprinted
in A. WIDIss, A GUIDE TO UINSURED MOroRisT COVERAGE app. at 296-97 (1969) (emphasis
omitted).
107. See note 104 supra.
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under one policy, each company would pay the insured $10,000. By
upholding the validity of the pro rata clause as it applied to one policy
limit, the court apparently would have contravened the statutory re-
quirement that each insurer provide its insured with $20,000 of medical
loss benefits. 08 Consequently, any attempt by an insurer to pay less than
the full $20,000 in medical loss benefits under its policy, while the in-
sured remained uncompensated for the actual losses incurred, would
permit the insurer to dilute its insurance obligation below the statutory
minimum. Furthermore, insurance carriers would be receiving an un-
earned windfall because their insureds would be unable to collect bene-
fits from the second policy.'"'
The Minnesota Supreme Court first recognized that an insurer would
be reducing its coverage below the statutory minimum, unless stacking
were permitted, in the context of the court's uninsured motorist deci-
sions." 0 In perhaps the most quoted language of any Minnesota unin-
sured motorist decision, Chief Justice Knutson succinctly stated the
rationale behind the dilution argument:
It seems to us that, in spite of the attempt by the insurer to limit its
liability to one policy or to the amount recoverable under one policy,
the fact that the legislature required an uninsured-motorist provision
in all policies, added to the fact that a premium has been collected on
each of the policies involved, should result in the policyholder's receiv-
ing what he paid for on each policy, up to the full amount of his
damages. It is true that such holding results in permissible recovery
exceeding what he would have received if the uninsured motorist had
been insured for the minimum amount required under our Safety Re-
sponsibility Act. But, if the question must be resolved on the basis of
who gets a windfall, it seems more just that the insured who has paid
a premium should get all he paid for rather than that the insurer should
escape liability for that which it collected a premium."'
Because every automobile registered in Minnesota is required by the
Minnesota Act to be insured,"' an insurance carrier similarly would be
reducing its coverage below the statutory minimum and receiving an
108. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.44(1)(a) (1978). For purposes of discussion, the argument
set forth in the text is made under the assumption that the insured only has the minimum
amount of medical coverage, $20,000, under each policy. The insured may purchase addi-
tional first-party benefits under the Minnesota Act if so desired. See id. § 65B.49(6)(e);
notes 59-61 supra and accompanying text.
109. See note 103 supra.
110. See Pleitgen v. Farmer's Ins. Exch., 296 Minn. 191, 195, 207 N.W.2d 535, 538
(1973); Van Tassel v. Horace Mann Mut. Ins. Co., 296 Minn. 181, 190-91, 207 N.W.2d 348,
353-54 (1973).
111. Van Tassel v. Horace Mann Mut. Ins. Co., 296 Minn. 181, 187, 207 N.W.2d 348,
351-52 (1973).
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unearned windfall unless stacking were permitted. Therefore, the better
rationale, as adopted in Wasche, permits first-party benefits to be
stacked to the extent of an insured's actual injuries or until the com-
bined policy coverages are exhausted."3 By adopting this position, the
Minnesota Supreme Court has prevented an insurer from diluting its
mandatory insurance coverage below the statutory minimum. More-
over, the Wasche court has reached a result that is consistent with one
of the purposes of the Minnesota Act-"to relieve the severe economic
distress of uncompensated accident victims"I"-without violating an-
other purpose of the Act-the prevention of duplicate recovery." 5
Ill. FUTURE PROBLEMS
By permitting first-party benefits to be stacked, the Minnesota Su-
preme Court has resolved, at least temporarily, one controversial issue
under the Minnesota Act.' 6 As a result of the court's decision in Wasche,
113. Applying this rationale to the situation in which the injured party owns two auto-
mobiles that are insured by different insurance carriers, the insured would be compen-
sated for the full $30,000. Each insurance company would pay its pro rata share of $15,000,
well within the limits of the individual insurer.
114. MINN. STAT. § 65B.42(1) (1978); see notes 38-50 supra and accompanying text.
115. MINN. STAT. § 65B.42(5) (1978); see notes 38-50 supra and accompanying text.
116. In perhaps the most far-reaching stacking decision to date, a Hennepin County
District Court has held that a nonresident policyholder who is injured in Minnesota may
stack first-party benefits under the Minnesota Act even though the nonresident
policyholder's own state does not have a no-fault automobile insurance system. See Petty
v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 749298 (Minn. 4th Dist. Ct. Apr. 3, 1979).
In Petty, the plaintiffs, California residents, were injured in Minnesota while visiting
their daughter. At the time of the accident the plaintiffs were driving their daughter's car
which was insured by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. The plaintiffs
owned two automobiles insured under a single policy by defendant Allstate Insurance
Company. The automobile insurance policy was issued to plaintiffs in their home state of
California. At the time of the accident, Allstate was licensed to write insurance in Minne-
sota as well as in California.
The plaintiffs sought to recover from Allstate wage loss benefits up to the combined
policy limits of $20,000. Allstate paid the full amount of wage loss benefits under one
coverage, $10,000, but refused to provide additional wage loss benefits under the insurance
covering the second vehicle, asserting that the Wasche decision did not apply because the
plaintiffs were nonresidents and had not paid any premiums to entitle them to no-fault
benefits. The lower court did not find this distinction important, stating:
Defendant [Allstate] contends that Wasche is not controlling in this case
because plaintiffs, as California residents, were not required to pay any prem-
iums for no-fault benefits. It is argued that since the policy covering the two
insured vehicles does not expressly provide for the coverages sought to be
stacked, the fundamental basis for coverage stacking is lacking.
The Court, however, is unpersuaded that the situation herein presented man-
dates a different result than that reached in the Wasche case. Pursuant to
Section 65B.50, Subd. 1, upon the occurrence of the accident, defendant was
required to provide no-fault benefits to the non-resident plaintiffs under their
policy whether or not plaintiffs paid premiums for such benefits. Since the
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however, both the Minnesota Supreme Court and the Legislature may
be called upon to address at least three issues that arise from the court's
"stacking" decisions. An issue with which the supreme court will be
confronted is whether underinsured motorist coverage" 7 may be stacked
and, if so, how the setoff provision"' of the underinsured motorist sec-
tion operates. Second, the Legislature may be asked to clarify the ap-
plicability of the word "insured" as currently defined by the Minne-
sota Act;" that is, did the Legislature intend to permit the stacking of
basic economic loss benefits when all vehicles are insured under the
same name but to deny stacking when one household member is the
named insured under a policy separate from that of another household
member? Finally, in light of the court's decision to permit stacking of
first-party benefits, the Legislature will be asked to consider the ramifi-
cations of stacking on insurance premium rates.2'
A. Underinsured Motorist Coverage
Having determined that both uninsured motorist and basic economic
loss benefits may be stacked, 2 ' the Minnesota Supreme Court probably
will be presented with the issue of whether multiple underinsured mo-
torist coverages may be stacked. Should the court answer this question
separate coverages automatically converted to coverages required under the
[Minnesota] Act, the combined limits of basic economic loss benefits under
both coverages were available to compensate plaintiffs for actual loss caused by
the automobile accident.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Based on the current language of the Minnesota Act, the lower court probably was
correct in permitting the California plaintiffs to stack the wage loss benefits of their
insurance policy. The Minnesota Act requires a nonresident owner of a motor vehicle to
maintain a plan of no-fault automobile insurance while operating a motor vehicle in this
state. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.48(1) (1978). Moreover, section 65B.46, subdivision 1 states
that "[i]f the accident causing injury occurs in this state, every person suffering loss from
injury arising out of maintenance or use of a motor vehicle has a right to basic economic
loss benefits." Arguably, therefore, the Minnesota Legislature intends to treat nonresident
victims of accidents occurring in this state the same as it treats Minnesota residents. If
the Minnesota Legislature had intended a different result between resident and nonresi-
dent accident victims it would have so provided.
117. The Minnesota Legislature requires all no-fault insurers to offer optional
underinsured motorist coverage to their insureds. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.49(6)(e)
(1978). For a discussion of underinsured motorist benefits, see notes 121-35 infra and
accompanying text.
118. The underinsured motorist setoff provision is contained in MINN. STAT. §
65B.49(6)(e) (1978). For a discussion of the underinsured motorist setoff provision, see
notes 136-56 infra and accompanying text.
119. The Minnesota Act defines the term "insured" in MINN. STAT. § 65B.43(5) (1978).
For a discussion of the term "insured" as contained in the Minnesota Act, see notes 157-
68 infra and accompanying text.
120. See notes 169-78 infra and accompanying text.
121. See 268 N.W.2d at 918-19.
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in the affirmative, holding that multiple underinsured coverages may be
stacked, the court then must decide whether the first-party insurer is
entitled to setoff the amount of money that has been paid to its insured
by the negligent tortfeasor from the amount of the insured's underin-
sured motorist coverage.
1. Stacking
By definition, underinsured motorist coverage is applicable when the
policyholder obtains a judgment against a negligent tortfeasor in excess
of the tortfeasor's liability limits. 2 Unable to obtain full compensation
from the at-fault party's liability coverage, an insured must look to
underinsured motorist coverage to obtain payment for any uncompen-
sated injuries. If an insured has two or more policies with underinsured
motorist protection, the question arises whether these coverages may be
stacked.
In addressing this question, the Minnesota Supreme Court need only
turn to its uninsured motorist decisions' for an answer to the stacking
question."4 Two principal arguments support the conclusion that stack-
ing underinsured benefits should be permitted. First, -the underinsured
motorist provision under no-fault is similar to the uninsured motorist
provision that was in effect when the court held that uninsured motorist
benefits could be stacked.1z' Second, no material difference exists be-
122. The word "underinsured" has been interpreted differently by the courts. Some
courts define an underinsured motorist as a tortfeasor who has insurance, but in amounts
less than required by the laws of the injured party's state. See, e.g., Security Nat. Ins.
Co. v. Hand, 31 Cal. App. 3d 227, 235, 107 Cal. Rptr. 439, 444 (1973). In some jurisdictions,
underinsured motorist coverage is not set out in a separate statutory provision. Thus, the
courts in those jurisdictions define uninsured motorist to include not only one without
insurance but also one with less insurance than that required by the state whose law
applies to the accident. See, e.g., Calhoun v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 254 Cal.
App. 2d 407, 409-10, 62 Cal. Rptr. 177, 178-79 (1967).
Unlike most jurisdictions, Minnesota has a separate statutory provision for underin-
sured motorist coverage. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.49(6)(e) (1978). The term "underinsured"
is not, however, defined in the statute. The Minnesota Supreme Court, in Lick v. Dairy-
land Ins. Co., 258 N.W.2d 791 (Minn. 1977), stated that a tortfeasor is not underinsured
when he carries liability insurance in an amount equal to the underinsured motorist
coverage of the recovering party. Id. at 795. The definition of "underinsured," as applied
in Lick, probably is no longer authoritative in light of recent amendments to the underin-
sured motorist statute. See notes 149-56 infra and accompanying text.
123. See, e.g., Pleitgen v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 296 Minn. 191, 207 N.W.2d 535 (1973);
Van Tassel v. Horace Mann Mut. Ins. Co., 296 Minn. 181, 207 N.W.2d 348 (1973).
124. Several Minnesota District Courts have concluded that underinsured motorist
benefits may be stacked. See, e.g., rends v. Mutual Serv. Cas. Ins. Co., No. 41768 (Minn.
7th Dist. Ct. July 24, 1978); Stadler v. Austin Mut. Ins. Co., No. 20027 (Minn. 3d Dist.
Ct. May 24, 1977); Kalow v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 19768 (Minn. 3d Dist.
Ct. July 7, 1976).
125. Compare MINN. STAT. § 65B.49(6)(e) (1978) (underinsured motorist provision
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tween the stacking of underinsured motorist benefits and the stacking
of medical payment benefits, which was permitted prior to the adoption
of no-fault.
2
The first argument supporting the stacking of underinsured motorist
benefits is that the statutory requirements governing uninsured motorist
insurance coverage and underinsured motorist insurance coverage are
similar. Section 65B.49, subdivision 4 of the Minnesota Act requires
that every insurance policy issued in this state must contain uninsured
motorist coverage.'2 Similarly, section 65B.49, subdivision 6(e) requires
an insurer to offer underinsured motorist coverage to an insured.'2 ' In-
surance carriers contend, however, that because uninsured motorist cov-
erage is mandatory while underinsured motorist coverage is optional
under the statute, the stacking of underinsured motorist coverages
should not be permitted. 2' This distinction, however, should not be
controlling because the uninsured motorist statute in effect at the time
the court held that uninsured motorist coverages could be stacked is
essentially the same as the underinsured motorist statute in effect
under no-fault; no procedure established for accepting coverage) with Act of May 24, 1967,
ch. 837, § 1, 1967 Minn. Laws 1735, 1735 (current version at MINN. STAT. § 65B.49(4)
(1978)) (uninsured motorist provision in effect when stacking uninsured motorist cover-
ages first permitted; coverage accepted unless rejected in writing).
126. Just as underinsured motorist coverage is optional under the Minnesota Act, so
was medical payment coverage optional at the time of the uninsured motorist decisions.
See Van Tassel v. Horace Mann Mut. Ins. Co., 296 Minn. 181, 189, 207 N.W.2d 348, 353
(1973).
127. Section 65B.49(4) provides:
(1) No plan of reparation security may be renewed, delivered or issued for
delivery, or executed in this state with respect to any motor vehicle registered
or principally garaged in this state unless coverage is provided therein or supple-
mental thereto, in the amounts of $25,000 because of injury to or the death of
one person in any accident, and subject to the said limit for one person, $50,000
because of bodily injury to or the death of two or more persons in any one
accident, for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally en-
titled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles
and hit-and-run motor vehicles because of injury.
(2) Every owner of a motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this
state shall maintain uninsured motor vehicle coverage as provided in this subdi-
vision.
(3) "Uninsured motor vehicle" means any motor vehicle or motorcycle for
which a plan of reparation security meeting the requirements of sections 65B.41
to 65B.71 is not in effect.
(4) No recovery shall be permitted under the uninsured motor vehicle provi-
sions of this section for basic economic loss benefits paid or payable, or which
would be payable but for any applicable deductible.
MINN. STAT. § 65B.49(4) (1978).
128. See id. § 65B.49(6)(e) (1978). For the full text of subdivision 6(e), see note 60 supra.




et al.: Stacking of Basic Economic Loss Benefits Under the Minnesota No-F
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1979
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
today. 110 Previously, uninsured motorist coverage was included in an
insured's policy unless rejected in writing by the insured;"' presently the
Minnesota Act does not specifically state the procedure for accepting
underinsured motorist coverage. Thus, just as the court permitted the
stacking of uninsured motorist coverage when that coverage was op-
tional, so should the court permit the stacking of underinsured motorist
coverage when this coverage is optional. Furthermore, once electing to
purchase underinsured coverage, an insured should be entitled to re-
ceive the full benefits from each policy for which a premium was paid.
The assertion that underinsured motorist benefits should not be
stacked also is refuted by the stacking of medical payment coverages in
earlier years. Under prior Minnesota Supreme Court decisions, insureds
were permitted to stack medical payment coverages even though the
purchase of such coverage was entirely optional with an insured."' Once
an insured elected to purchase medical payment coverage, the fact that
such coverage was optional did not prevent an insured from stacking
these benefits."' Because an insured had paid a separate premium for
130.. Compare Act of May 24, 1967, ch. 837, § 1, 1967 Minn. Laws 1735 (current version
at MINN. STAT. § 65B.49(4) (1978)) with MINN. STAT. § 65B.49(6)(e) (1978) (underinsured
motorist provision). In Pleitgen v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 296 Minn. 191, 207 N.W.2d 535
(1973), a dispute arose as to whether the uninsured motorist statute as passed in 1967, or
the statute as amended in 1969 applied. See id. at 194, 207 N.W.2d at 537. Under the 1969
amendment to the uninsured motorist statute, the insured was no longer permitted to
reject such coverage in writing. See Act of May 23, 1969, ch. 630, 1969 Minn. Laws 1087,
1088 (repealed 1974). The Minnesota Supreme Court in Pleitgen, however, did not find
this distinction particularly significant with regard to the stacking question. There the
court stated:
We cannot see that this difference in language in these two statutory provisions
can have any bearing on the outcome of this case, because both statutes, under
our decision in Van Tassel, require each policy to offer coverage of "not less than
$10,000 because of bodily injury to or death of one person. . . and. . . not less
than $20,000" for injury to two or more persons in a single accident. Thus, under
either statute, the insurer is not free to restrict coverage to less than the mini-
mum limits for each policy.
296 Minn. at 194, 207 N.W.2d at 537 (emphasis added). The supreme court in Van Tassel
v. Horace Mann Mut. Ins. Co., 296 Minn. 181, 207 N.W.2d 348 (1973) also indicated that
the legislative changes were not relevant to the resolution of the stacking question. See
id. at 183 n.1, 207 N.W.2d at 349 n.1.
131. See Van Tassel v. Horace Mann Mut. Ins. Co., 296 Minn. 181, 184, 207 N.W.2d
348, 350 (1973); Act of May 24, 1967, ch. 837, § 1, 1967 Minn. Laws 1735 (current version
at MINN. STAT. § 65B.49(4) (1978)).
132. See Van Tassel v. Horace Mann Mut. Ins. Co., 296 Minn. 181, 189, 207 N.W.2d
348, 353 (1973).
133. The question of stacking medical payment benefits has been extensively litigated.
Presently, the overwhelming majority of the states permit medical payments to be
stacked. See, e.g., Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Tucker, 512 S.W.2d 679, 685-86 (Tex. 1974);
Dhane v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 497 S.W.2d 323, 328 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973); Comment,
Stacking of Medical Payments Limits Under the Family Automobile Policy, 9 CAmGHTroN
L. REv. 402, 407 (1975) ("The majority of courts which have considered the issue have
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medical payment coverage, the court reasoned that an insured should
receive the benefit of each provision for which a premium was paid
because medical coverage was not purchased for the benefit of the in-
surer. ' This reasoning is equally applicable to the stacking of underin-
sured motorist coverage. Although underinsured motorist benefits are
optional, once an insured elects this coverage an additional premium
must be paid. An insured therefore should be entitled to receive the
benefits of such coverage.'3
2. Setoffs
If the court concludes that underinsured motorist benefits may be
stacked, the operation of the setoff provision under the Minnesota Act
must be considered. 3 Two different views have been expressed on how
the setoff provision should operate. One view is that when a policyholder
obtains a judgment against a negligent tortfeasor in excess of the tort-
feasor's liability insurance coverage, 37 the policyholder obtains payment
allowed stacking of medical payments limits." (footnote omitted)); Comment,
Insurance-Pyramiding Medical Payment Coverages in Automobile Policies, 10 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 737, 745 (1974) ("The overwhelming weight of authority in the United
States is that medical payments insurance may be stacked." (footnote omitted)).
134. See Van Tassel v. Horace Mann Mut. Ins. Co., 296 Minn. 181, 190-91, 207 N.W.2d
348, 353-54 (1973) ("The medical insurance was not bought and paid for by the insured
for the benefit of the insurer.").
135. See notes 103-15 supra and accompanying text.
136. The setoff provision is found at MwnN. STAT. § 65B.49(6)(e) (1978). For the text of
section 65B.49(6)(e), see note 60 supra.
137. Each insurance policy issued in Minnesota must contain liability coverage in a
minimum amount of not less than $25,000 per person, as provided in section 65B.49(3),
which states:
(1) Each plan of reparation security shall also contain stated limits of liabil-
ity, exclusive of interests and costs, with respect to each vehicle for which
coverage is thereby granted, of not less than $25,000 because of bodily injury to
one person in any one accident and, subject to said limit for one person, of not
less than $50,000 because of injury to two or more persons in any one accident,
and, if the accident has resulted in injury to or destruction of property, of not
less than $10,000 because of such injury to or destruction of property of others
in any one accident.
(2) Under residual liability insurance the reparation obligor shall be liable
to pay, on behalf of the insured, sums which the insured is legally obligated to
pay as damages because of bodily injury and property damage arising out of the
ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle if the injury or damage occurs
within this state, the United States of America, its territories or possessions, or
Canada. A reparation obligor shall also be liable to pay sums which another
reparation obligor is entitled to recover under the indemnity provisions of sec-
tion 65B.53, subdivision 1.
(3) Every plan of reparation security shall be subject to the following provi-
sions which need not be contained therein:
(a) The liability of the reparation obligor with respect to the residual liabil-
ity coverage required by this clause shall become absolute whenever injury or
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on the unsatisfied judgment to the extent of his own underinsured mo-
torist coverage. 3 ' Proponents of the second view contend that the
amount paid by the tortfeasor's liability carrier is deducted from the
limits of the underinsured motorist coverage.3 9 Under this view, if a
tortfeasor's liability insurance meets or exceeds the underinsured motor-
ist coverage, the tortfeasor is not considered to be underinsured and
damage occurs; such liability may not be cancelled or annulled by any agree-
ment between the reparation obligor and the insured after the occurrence of the
injury or damage; no statement made by the insured or on his behalf and no
violation of said policy shall defeat or void said policy.
(b) The satisfaction by the insured of a judgment for such injury or damage
shall not be a condition precedent to the right or duty of the reparation obligor
to make payment on account of such injury or damage.
(c) The reparation obligor shall have the right to settle any claim covered
by the residual liability insurance policy, and if such settlement is made in good
faith, the amount thereof shall be deductible from the limits of liability for the
accident out of which such claim arose.
MINN. STAT. § 65B.49(3) (1978).
138. See, e.g., Stadler v. Austin Mut. Ins. Co., No. 20027 (Minn. 3d Dist. Ct. May 24,
1977); Kalow v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 19768 (Minn. 3d Dist. Ct. July 7,
1976) ($25,000 paid by underinsured tortfeasor's liability carrier setoff from the total
amount of damages sustained by insured rather than from the amount of insured's under-
insured motorist coverage).
For purposes of illustration, assume that X is properly insured under the Minnesota Act
and has underinsured motorist coverage in the amount of 25/50. X is in an accident with
Y who is also properly insured under the Minnesota Act and maintains residual liability
coverage in the statutory minimum amounts of 25/50. X obtains a judgment against Y
for $40,000. After Y's insurance carrier tenders the limits of its liability coverage to X, X
still remains uncompensated to the extent of $15,000. X would then receive the remaining
amount from his underinsured motorist coverage. The mathematical computations under
this view would be as follows:
(1) Total damages sustained ................... .$ 40,000
(2) Tortfeasor's liability coverage .......... .............. (25,000)
(3) Uncompensated damages after payment by
tortfeasor's liability carrier ........................ 15,000
(4) Underinsured motorist coverage ($25,000 available;
$15,000 needed for full reimbursement) ............... (15,000)
(5) Amount X remains uncompensated ..................... 0
139. See, e.g., Thiry v. Horace Mann Mut. Ins. Co., 269 N.W.2d 66, 68 (Minn. 1978)
(tortfeasor is not underinsured when carrying liability insurance in an amount equal to
underinsured motorist coverage carried by plaintiff); Lick v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 258
N.W.2d 791, 795 (Minn. 1977) (tortfeasor is not underinsured when tortfeasor's liability
coverage and decedent's underinsured motorist coverages are the same); Arends v. Mutual
Serv. Cas. Ins. Co., No. 41768 (Minn. 7th Dist. Ct. July 24, 1978) (plaintiffs entitled to
stack underinsured motorist benefits but the $50,000 paid by tortfeasor's liability carrier
must be deducted from the stacked benefits).
Assuming the same facts as described in note 138 supra, the mathematical computa-
tions under the second view would be as follows:
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therefore no payments will be made pursuant to an underinsured motor-
ist provision. 40
The Minnesota Supreme Court decision has adopted the second view,
holding that the insured is not entitled to recover underinsured motorist
benefits when the tortfeasor's liability coverage is equal to the insured's
(1) Total damages sustained ........................... $ 40,000
(2) Tortfeasor's liability coverage ......................... (25,000)
(3) Uncompensated damages remaining after
payment by tortfeasor's liability carrier
(4) Underinsured motorist coverage
Less: liability coverage paid
Excess of underinsured motorist
coverage over liability coverage
(5) Amount X remains uncompensated after






If, under the second view, X was an insured under two policies and was allowed to stack
the underinsured motorist benefits of each policy, the computations would be as follows:
(1) Total damages sustained .......................... $ 40,000
(2) Tortfeasor's liability coverage ......................... (25,000)
(3) Uncompensated damages remaining after
payment by tortfeasor's liability carrier ....
(4) Underinsured motorist coverage
Underinsured motorist coverage available
(2 x 25,000 = 50,000 of stacked benefits)
Less: Liability coverage paid
Excess of underinsured motorist coverage
over liability coverage






(5) Amount X remains uncompensated .................... 0
140. See note 122 supra.
141. See Lick v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 258 N.W.2d 791 (Minn. 1977). The Minnesota court
recently affirmed the holding of Lick in Thiry v. Horace Mann Mut. Ins. Co., 269 N.W.2d
66 (Minn. 1978). Under either view, the injured party must exhaust the defendant's
liability coverage before collecting benefits from the injured party's underinsured motorist
coverage. In the illustrations set out in notes 138 and 139 supra, X's recovery of first-party
benefits has not been considered in determining the amount X has received. The Minne-
sota Act states, however, that all basic economic loss benefits shall be deducted first from
any tort recovery where the negligence cause of action arose out of the maintenance,
operation, ownership, or use of a motor vehicle. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.51(1) (1978). For
example, if X were an insured under two policies and sustained $70,000 in medical expen-
ses, the computation would be as follows:
(1) Total medical expense ...................
(2) Less: first-party benefits (2 X 20,000 -
.$ 70,000
40,000 stacked benefits) .............................. (40,000)
(3) Less: tortfeasor's liability coverage .................. (25,000)
(4) Uncompensated damages ............................. 5,000
(5) Underinsured motorist coverage
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underinsured motorist coverage."' In Lick v. Dairyland Insurance Co.,, 2
View 1: Underinsured motorist coverage
available (2 X 25,000
50,000 of stacked benefits) .......... 50,000
OR
View 2: Total underinsured motorist
coverage (2 X 25,000 =
50,000 of stacked benefits) ........... 50,000
Less: liability coverage ............. (25,000)
Excess: amount of under-
insured motorist coverage
available ........................... 25,000
Amount of underinsured motorist
coverage needed for full reim-
bursem ent .......................... (5,000)
(6) Amount X remains uncompensated .................... 0
Thus, basic economic loss benefits must be deducted first from the total amount of
economic loss incurred before determining the amount recoverable under the underin-
sured motorist section by operation of the setoff provision. Here, X would be compensated
in full under either view because there are sufficient underinsured motorist benefits avail-
able under both views.
142. 258 N.W.2d 791 (Minn. 1977). The underinsured motorist statute in effect at the
time of Lick and Thiry v. Horace Mann Mut. Ins. Co., 269 N.W.2d 66 (Minn. 1978)
provided:
Beginning January 1, 1972, underinsured motorist coverage, whereby subject to
the terms and conditions of such coverage the insurance company agrees to pay
its own insured for such uncompensated damages as he may recover on account
of an automobile accident because the judgment recovered against the owner of
the other vehicle exceeds the policy limits thereon, to the extent of the policy
limits on the vehicle of the party recovering or such smaller limits as he may
select less the amount paid by the liability insurer of the party recovered
against. His insurance company shall be subrogated to any amounts it so pays,
and upon payment shall have an assignment of the judgment against the other
party to the extent of the money it pays.
Act of May 27, 1971, ch. 581, § 1, 1971 Minn. Laws 1082, 1082-83 (emphasis added). The
language was reenacted as part of the Minnesota Act with minor modification. Compare
id. with Act of Apr. 11, 1974, ch. 408, § 9, 1974 Minn. Laws 762, 773-74 (current version
at MINN. STAT. § 65B.49(6)(e) (1978)). That section of the Minnesota Act originally pro-
vided:
Underinsured motorist coverage whereby subject to the term and conditions
of such coverage the reparation obligor agrees to pay its insureds for such un-
compensated damages as they are legally entitled to recover on account of a
motor vehicle accident because the total damages they are legally entitled to
recover exceed the residual liability limit of the owner of the other vehicle, to
the extent of the residual liability limits on the motor vehicle of the person
legally entitled to recover or such smaller limits as he may select less the amount
paid by reparation obligor of the person against whom he is entitled to recover.
His reparation obligor shall be subrogated to any amounts it pays and upon
payment shall have an assignment of the judgment if any against the other
person to the extent of the money it pays.
Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act, ch. 408, § 9, 1974 Minn. Laws 762, 773-
74 (current version at MmN. STAT. § 65B.49(6)(e) (1978)) (emphasis added).
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a pre-no-fault case,"' the court held that when the tortfeasor carried
liability insurance in an amount equal to the underinsured motorist
coverage carried by the plaintiff's decedent, the negligent tortfeasor was
not underinsured." Furthermore, the court held that the decedent's
insurance carrier was entitled to set off from its insured's underinsured
motorist coverage the amount paid by the tortfeasor's liability insurer.1
5
As a result, the decedent's estate was unable to recover the uncompen-
sated portion of the judgment from the decedent's underinsured motor-
ist coverage. "I
Until recently, the court's decision in Lick seemed to be mandated by
the express language of the Minnesota Act, which provided that the
amount of an insured's underinsured motorist coverage, "less the
amount paid by the reparation obligor [liability carrier] of the person
against whom he is entitled to recover," shall be paid by the insurer
toward the unsatisfied judgment of its insured."' Thus, in Lick the
insured was unable to obtain any payments from his underinsured mo-
torist coverage when the tortfeasor's liability insurance coverage was in
the same amount."
8
143. The Minnesota Act was passed in 1974 and became effective on January 1, 1975.
See Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act, ch. 408, 1974 Minn. Laws 762, 786
(amended 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, and 1979) (codified as MINN. STAT. §§ 65B.41-.71). The
Minnesota Act did not apply, however, to accidents occurring before January 1, 1975, even
though the cases were not decided until after its effective date. Id. § 35, 1974 Minn. Laws
at 786. The accident in Thiry v. Horace Mann Mut. Ins. Co., 269 N.W.2d 66 (Minn. 1978)
occurred on November 29, 1974 and the accident in Lick v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 258 N.W.2d
791 (Minn. 1977) occurred on July 2, 1974. Thus, the Minnesota Supreme Court applied
the pre-no-fault underinsured motorist statute in both Thiry and Lick. The pre-no-fault
underinsured motorist statute and the original no-fault underinsured motorist statute,
before its recent amendment, had remarkably similar language. See note 142 supra.
144. See 258 N.W.2d at 795.
145. See id. at 794.
146. See id. at 794-95. The Minnesota Supreme Court interpreted the pre-no-fault
underinsured motorist statute in both Lick and Thiry. The Minnesota Act, however, does
not have any effect on the underinsured motorist provision because the underinsured
motorist provision operates the same now as it did then. Hence, the determinative factor
in applying the underinsured motorist statute is not whether the case arose under no-fault
but whether the amendments have modified the setoff language as it existed in the under-
insured motorist statute both before and after the effective date of the Minnesota Act.
See notes 149-56 infra and accompanying text.
147. Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act, ch. 408, § 9, 1974 Minn. Laws 762,
773-74 (current version at MiNN. STAT. § 65B.49(6)(e) (1978)).
148. This outcome is troublesome in that the underinsured motorist coverage never will
be applicable in an accident with another Minnesota resident, assuming that the amounts
of the underinsured motorist and residual liability coverages are equal. See Lick v. Dairy-
land Ins. Co., 258 N.W.2d 791, 794 n.3 (Minn. 1977). If the underinsured motorist carrier
is permitted to setoff the tortfeasor's liability payment against the limits of the underin-
sured motorist coverage, the injured person will not be compensated for any damages that
remain unpaid by the negligent tortfeasor. Consequently, an insured will have paid a
premium for underinsured motorist coverage without receiving a corresponding benefit.
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In 1977, however, the Legislature amended the underinsured motorist
provision, significantly altering the language of that section.' The lan-
guage deleted by the Legislature was nearly identical to the language
on which the Lick court relied in resolving the setoff issue. 5 0 This result
arguably indicates a legislative intent to preclude an insurer from set-
ting off the amounts paid by a liability carrier against the insured's
underinsured motorist coverage.' 5' By removing the phrase "less the
amount paid by reparation obligor of the person against whom he is
entitled to recover" from the underinsured motorist section, 5 the Min-
nesota Legislature has indicated, in clear and unambiguous terms, an
intent to prevent an insurer from reducing the amounts of liability cov-
erage received by its insured from the insured's underinsured motorist
coverage. 153
Thus, the underinsured motorist provision, because of the recent
amendment, 5 ' now operates in a manner such that an insurer can no
longer reduce its underinsured motorist coverage by the amount of the
The Minnesota Act, however, in most instances appears to base the amount of underin-
sured motorist coverage on the amount of residual liability coverage that is purchased.
Compare MIN. STAT. § 65B.49(3) (1978) (insured must maintain residual liability cover-
ages of not less than $25,000 per person and not less than $50,000 because of injury to two
or more persons) with id. § 65B.49(6)(e) (underinsured motorist coverage offered in an
amount at least equal to the amount of residual liability coverage or such lower amounts
as the insured may select).
149. See Act of May 25, 1977, ch. 266, § 3, 1977 Minn. Laws 437, 438 (amending MINN.
STAT. § 65B.49(6)(e) (1976)).
150. In Lick the court stated that the language "less the amount paid by the liability
insurer of the party recovered against" in the underinsured motorist statute explicitly
required a setoff. See 258 N.W.2d at 793. The 1977 amendment to the Minnesota Act
deleted the language "less the amount paid by reparation obligor of the person against
whom he is entitled to recover." Act of May 25, 1977, ch. 266, § 3, 1977 Minn. Laws 437,
438 (amending MINN. STAT. § 65B.49(6)(e) (1976)). In Thiry v. Horace Mann Mut. Ins.
Co., 269 N.W.2d 66 (Minn. 1978), the Minnesota Supreme Court cited with approval the
Lick decision, without elaborating further on the underinsured motorist statute and the
setoff provision. See id. at 68. The Thiry court, however, applied the statute as it read
prior to the 1977 amendment. See id.
151. Additionally, the title to the 1977 amendment, although not part of the law, states
that the amendment is "[an act relating to automobile insurance; clarifying certain
ambiguous provisions in the Minnesota no-fault automobile insurance act; amending
Minnesota Statutes 1976, Sections. . . 65B.49, Subdivisions 4 and 6; . Act of May
25, 1977, ch. 266, 1977 Minn. Laws 437, 437 (emphasis added).
152. See Act of May 25, 1977, ch. 266, § 3, 1977 Minn. Laws 437, 438 (amending MINN.
STAT. § 65B.49(6)(e) (1976)).
153. Thus, under the original hypothetical, see note 138 supra, X, after exhausting Ys
$25,000 liability insurance, would be entitled to collect the remaining $15,000 from his
underinsured motorist coverage. This result is consistent with both the legislative intent
as indicated by the 1977 amendment to the underinsured motorist statute and the public
policy of ensuring that a policyholder receives the full amount of coverage available.
154. See Act of May 25, 1977, ch. 266, § 3, 1977 Minn. Laws 437, 438 (amending MINN.
STAT. § 65B.49(6)(e) (1976)).
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tortfeasor's liability coverage, thereby achieving the result proposed
under the first view that an insured party is entitled to receive the full
amount of the available underinsured motorist coverage, to the extent
of losses suffered.' Additionally, this result is consistent with the public
policy of ensuring that policyholders receive the full benefit of each
coverage for which a premium is paid.11s
B. Definitional Problem: "Insured" Under Whose Policy?
A matter that the Minnesota Legislature must address immediately
is the manner in which the application of the word "insured," as defined
by statute,'57 acts as a limiting provision on stacking. For purposes of
determining whether coverage is available under a particular policy,
section 65B.43, subdivision 5 provides that an "insured" includes the
"named insured"'' and numerous other unnamed insureds, including
the spouse, other relatives of the named insured, and minors in custody
of the named insured, who reside in the same household with the named
insured and who are not identified by name in any other no-fault insur-
ance policy.' The problem that arises as a result of this definitional
provision is that first-party benefits may be stacked when all vehicles
in the household are insured by the same named insured,'"0 whereas
first-party benefits cannot be stacked if the household members insure
their own vehicles under separate policies,' 6 ' because the spouse, relative
155. See notes 137-38 supra and accompanying text.
156. See notes 103-15 supra and accompanying text.
157. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.43(5) (1978). For the full text of subdivision 5, see note 29
supra.
158. Although not defined by statute, a "named insured" is the person listed in the
policy indorsement and is generally the one responsible for payment of the insurance
premiums. Some courts distinguish between the named insured and the unnamed insured
by providing the named insured with a "broad reservoir of coverage" that may be unavail-
able to the unnamed insured. See, e.g., Sturdy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 203 Kan. 783, 791,
457 P.2d 34, 40-41 (1969). See also 16 WASHBURN L.J. 764 (1977).
159. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.43, subd. 5(1)-(3) (1978).
160. See, e.g., Wasche v. Milbank Mut. Ins. Co., 268 N.W.2d 913, 916-17 n.4 (Minn.
1978). To illustrate this point further, assume that a husband and a wife have two automo-
biles. If the husband is the named insured on both policies, the wife apparently would be
permitted to stack the first-party benefits of both policies. Because the wife is the spouse
of the named insured, resides in the same household as the named insured, and is not
identified by name as an insured in another no-fault policy, stacking would be permitted.
See MINN. STAT. § 65B.43(5) (1978).
161. See, e.g., Wasche v. Milbank Mut. Ins. Co., 268 N.W.2d 913, 916-17 n.4 (Minn.
1978). If the fact situation in note 160 supra is altered slightly, the definitional problem
becomes apparent. Assume, instead, that a husband and a wife each own an automobile.
Each person is the named insured under his or her respective no-fault policy. If the wife
subsequently is injured in an automobile accident and sustains $30,000 in medical expen-
ses, she will not be permitted to stack her husband's policy onto hers; although she resides
in the same household, she is not an insured under her husband's policy because she is
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of the named insured, or minor in custody would be identified by name
as an insured in another no-fault policy.' Consequently, those insureds
who are unaware of this technicality may be left with uncompensated
damages even though the insurance coverages, if combined, would not
have been exhausted.163
The statutory history of section 65B.43, subdivision 5 supports the
proposition that the Legislature did not intend that the word "insured"
would have a limiting effect on stacking. Subdivision 5 was taken nearly
verbatim from the language of UMVARA. 64 The comments to UM-
VARA indicate that UMVARA defines "insured" only for purposes of
identifying which policy provides coverage when more than one no-fault
policy is available."e Because UMVARA provides for unlimited medical
benefits, 6 ' stacking will never occur, as stacking, by definition, requires
identified by name in her own insurance policy, thereby excluding her from coverage under
her husband's policy. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.43(5) (1978).
162. In one of the consolidated cases in Wasche, Clark Bock owned two automobiles,
both of which were insured in his name. Clark's father resided in the same household and
also owned an automobile, which the father separately insured in his name. Clark sought
to stack both of his policies as well as that of his father's. Focusing on the language of
section 65B.43, subdivision 5, the Wasche court permitted Clark to stack his policies but
not the father's policy, reasoning that Clark was not an insured under the father's policy
because Clark was identified by name in another no-fault policy. See Wasche v. Milbank
Mut. Ins. Co., 268 N.W.2d 913, 916-17 n.4 (Minn. 1978). Even if Clark had been permitted
to stack his father's policy, he still would not have been completely compensated for the
loss that he incurred. The court's decision to deny stacking of the father's policy, therefore,
apparently is inconsistent with one of the express purposes of the Minnesota Act-to
relieve the severe economic expense incurred by accident victims. See MINN. STAT. §
65B.42(1) (1978); notes 38-44 supra and accompanying text.
163. Whether the Legislature intended such a result seems doubtful. See notes 38-44
supra and accompanying text.
164. UMVARA defines "basic reparation insured" as:
(i) a person identified by name as an insured in a contract of basic reparation
insurance complying with this Act (Section 7(d)); and
(ii) while residing in the same household with a named insured, the following
persons not identified by name as an insured in any other contract of basic
reparation insurance complying with this Act: a spouse or other relative of a
named insured; and a minor in the custody of a named insured or of a relative
residing in the same household with a named insured. A person resides in the
same household if he usually makes his home in the same family unit, even
though he temporarily lives elsewhere.
UMVARA § 1(a)(3)(i)-(ii). The Minnesota Act contains a comparable provision.
Compare id. (defining basic reparation insured) with MINN. STAT. § 65B.43(5) (1978)
(defining an insured).
165. The comments to section 1 of UMVARA indicate that a relative who is a named
insured in one insurance policy is not an insured under another policy. Thus, Itihis
qualification [of not being a named insured under another policy] serves to ameliorate
the problems of identifying the policy which provides coverage where there is more than
one basic reparation policy covering members of the same family unit." UMVARA § 1,
Comment (1972).
166. See note 84 supra.
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finite policy limits. Thus, the definition of "insured," as adopted by the
Minnesota Legislature from UMVARA, should not be construed to be a
limitation on stacking when it was not so construed under UMVARA. 16
Although the Minnesota Act does place finite limits on first-party bene-
fits, the intent of providing for full coverage under the Minnesota Act
can be accomplished only if an injured party is permitted to stack all
policies within the same household, regardless of which "insured" cate-
gory the injured person falls under.
In summary, to deny stacking based-on the mere fortuity of the person
listed as the named insured in an insurance policy may result in an
inequitable application of the Minnesota Act. Although the Wasche
court held that members of the same household could not stack the first-
party benefits of other members of the household if listed as named
insureds under separate policies," 8 the court was unable to set forth any
sound, logical reasoning as to why the two categories of "insureds"
should be distinguished for purposes of stacking. Therefore, the Legis-
lature must clarify the definition of "insured," as failure to do so may
result in an arbitrary application of the stacking principle.
C. Effect of Stacking on Premium Rates
Although the Wasche court correctly interpreted the Minnesota Act
as it pertains to stacking, the stacking of first-party benefits may have
serious ramifications on premium rates,"9 leading to increased costs for
no-fault insurance.' If premiums are increased substantially, those in-
sureds with lower incomes may be unable to afford insurance coverage,
resulting in more uninsured motor vehicles on the highways and, in
turn, more uncompensated accident victims.'' This result would defeat
167. See note 164 supra.
168. See 268 N.W.2d at 916-17 n.4.
169. Mutual Service contended that its underwriters did not take stacking into consid-
eration when determining no-fault automobile insurance premiums but that as a result
of stacking, premium rates may be increased. See Appellant's Brief and Appendix at 5-8,
A-15 to -19, Wasche v. Milbank Mut. Ins. Co., 268 N.W.2d 913 (Minn. 1978) (brief of
appellant Mutual Service Casualty Insurance Company). For a discussion of an opposing
viewpoint, however, see note 103 supra.
170. One of the philosophies behind the no-fault system is that the burden of the losses
is to be borne by the system that is responsible for creating those losses, rather than by
the public at large. Insurance coverage is mandatory under the Minnesota Act and there-
fore most losses can be paid from within the system. Because the system that causes the
loss must pay for the loss, the policyholder ultimately will have to bear this increased cost
to the system in the form of increased premium rates. If the increased costs to the policy-
holder would create a hardship, it may be appropriate to question whether such a result
was intended by the Legislature. See Note, supra note 5, at 121 n.7.
171. The compulsory nature of no-fault automobile insurance has resulted in an in-
crease in the percentage of insured vehicles. Prior to the adoption of no-fault, the percent-
age of uninsured vehicles in Minnesota at any one time was probably between 9% and
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a primary purpose of the Minnesota Act which is to relieve the severe
economic distress of an uncompensated accident victim.
7 2
Two factors suggest that stacking first-party benefits may have a
detrimental impact on insurance premiums. First, stacking first-party
benefits is potentially available in every situation in which an insured
is injured, because first-party benefits are payable without regard to
fault.'7 3 Second, first-party benefits are payable regardless of whether
another involved motor vehicle is insured.'74
Unlike first-party benefits, stacking uninsured motorist coverage is
applicable only in limited circumstances: first, the injured victim must
not be at fault' and, second, the negligent tortfeasor must be unin-
sured.' Thus, the circumstances that would warrant the stacking of
first-party benefits will occur with much greater frequency than would
occur under uninsured motorist coverage. Arguably, the additional ex-
penditures that insurance carriers will incur as a result of stacking first-
party benefits will not be statistically insignificant for purposes of calcu-
lating insurance premiums.'
22% based on studies conducted by the Minnesota Department of Public Safety and the
United States Department of Transportation. Studies conducted by the Minnesota De-
partment of Public Safety after the adoption of no-fault indicate a decrease in the percent-
age of uninsured vehicles to approximately 4%. The 4% uninsured vehicle figure is based
on a sampling of 7% to 10% of the motor vehicle registrations and a check on all accidents
to determine if insurance coverage is in force. See Letter from James P. Kelly, Insurance
Analyst, Insurance Division, Minnesota Department of Public Safety (March 13, 1979) (on
file in William Mitchell Law Review office).
Although Minnesota's compulsory no-fault insurance law has not resulted in 100%
compliance, it has reduced substantially the percentage of motorists driving without
insurance coverage. Because a higher percentage of motorists is insured, the likelihood of
an insured victim not having insurance benefits against which to recover is smaller.
Consequently, most accident victims now are able to obtain immediate compensation for
their injuries.
172. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.42(1) (1978). For the full text of section 65B.42, see note
38 supra.
173. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.49(l) (1978).
174. Unless the injured party's injuries exceed the amount of basic economic loss bene-
fits available, the insured will have no need to resort to the uninsured motorist benefits.
175. Subdivision 4 of section 65B.49 provides that only those "who are legally entitled
to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles and hit-and-run
motor vehicles because of injury," may recover uninsured motorist coverage. MINN. STAT.
§ 65B.49, subd. 4(1) (1978). For the full text of subdivision 4 of section 65B.49, see note
127 supra.
176. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.49(4) (1978).
177. Under the Minnesota Act, the basic unit of first-party coverage provides an insured
with $20,000 in medical loss benefits. See id. § 65B.44(1)(a). Recent studies conducted in
Massachusetts revealed that less than five percent of all claims made for medical expenses
under the Massachusetts no-fault law exceeded $1,500. See Widiss, Bovbjerg & Cavers,
The Massachusetts Study, in NO-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANcE IN ACTION: THE EXPERI-
ENCES IN MASSACHusETTS, FLORIDA, DELAWARE AND MICHIGAN 201 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as NO-FAULT IN ACTION].
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Whether the stacking of basic economic loss benefits has an effect on
premium rates has not yet been statistically determined. The Legisla-
ture must address this problem, however, in order to maintain insurance
premium rates at a level affordable to all, seeking a solution that will
be equitable to both the policyholder and the insurance carrier. In doing
so, the Legislature must keep in mind a primary purpose of the Minne-
sota Act-to relieve the severe economic distress of uncompensated acci-
dent victims--which stacking accomplishes. At the same time, the
Legislature must find a way to ameliorate the added cost to the insur-
ance industry without having an adverse effect or putting an undue
burden on the system's policyholders.
IV. A SUGGESTED SOLUTION
In accordance with the Wasche decision, insurance carriers must as-
sume that the stacking of insurance coverages will be permitted and
must consider that factor when calculating premium rates, regardless of
what type of antistacking provision is written into the insurance pol-
icy. '7 Permitting the stacking of basic economic loss benefits, however,
may be more medicine than the doctor ordered, because it may have an
adverse impact on insurance rates, thus making no-fault automobile
insurance unaffordable to some.' If the stacking of first-party benefits
is assumed to increase insurance rates, then the more equitable ap-
proach may be for the Legislature to increase the basic unit of first-party
coverage from $30,000' s1 to $50,000, while enacting antistacking legisla-
tion that would limit basic economic loss benefits to the amount re-
coverable under one policy, regardless of the number of policies applica-
ble. 8
2
Although the percentage of catastrophic medical claims (claims in excess of $25,000)
arising out of automobile accidents is low, the amount of financing needed to cover those
losses may not be. For example, a preliminary study conducted by the National Associa-
tion of Independent Insurers [hereinafter cited as NAII] of catastrophic medical claims
in Michigan revealed that NAII insurers have established reserves totalling $32,000,000
for medical expenses of $25,000 and over. The NAII insurers insure approximately 43% of
the private passenger vehicles in Michigan. See Jones, The Michigan Study, in No-FAULT
IN ACTION, supra, at 381. Thus, if all insurers writing automobile insurance in Michigan
are considered, the aggregate reserves set aside for medical expenses in excess of $25,000
may exceed $64,000,000.
178. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.42(1) (1978).
179. See note 105 supra.
180. See notes 169-77 supra and accompanying text.
181. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.44(1) (1978).
182. The 1979 Minnesota Legislature considered an antistacking bill that would reach
a result similar to the solution proposed by this Comment. The bill, as passed by the
Senate, prohibited not only the stacking of first-party benefits but also prohibited the
stacking of uninsured and underinsured motorist coverages as well. The Senate bill also
would have raised the basic unit of coverage to $50,000, with $30,000 being allocated to
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Raising the basic unit of first-party benefits to $50,000, allocating
$35,000 for medical expenses and $15,000 for wage loss, replacement
services loss, and other out-of-pocket expenses, would result in more
equitable treatment among insureds. The increase in first-party benefits
would be more accomodating to those households owning only one vehi-
cle; the members of those households are more likely to be fully compen-
sated for their injuries than they were before because, owning only one
vehicle, stacking was of no benefit to them. Moreover, members of mul-
ticar households will not be substantially affected by the one-policy
limitation because the additional medical benefits available under one
policy may be sufficient to compensate in full the vast majority of inju-
ries sustained. s3 Thus, although limiting first-party benefits to the
amount recoverable under one policy, the increased amount of coverage
medical expense loss benefits and $20,000 being allocated to income loss benefits. The
language prohibiting the stacking of first-party benefits would read as follows:
Unless the language of the policies provides otherwise, if two or more insur-
ance policies are available to provide basic economic loss benefits to an insured,
the amount of recovery shall not exceed the amount which could be recovered
in basic economic loss benefits under one policy. The existence of two or more
insurance policies covering basic economic loss benefits shall not increase the
amount of recovery for basic economic loss benefits beyond that provided by one
insurance policy.
S.F. No. 58, § 2, 71st Minn. Legis., 1979 Sess. (underscoring deleted).
During the legislative session the House of Representatives also considered the anti-
stacking bill as passed by the Senate. The Financial Institutions and Insurance Standing
Committee amended S.F. No. 58 and the bill as passed by that committee only would
have prohibited the stacking of first-party benefits and would have excluded any prohibi-
tion on stacking uninsured and underinsured motorist benefits. Due to the numerous
problems encountered by the 1979 Legislature, the bill, as amended by the Financial
Institutions and Insurance Standing Committee, failed to be scheduled for floor considera-
tion by the full House before the 1979 legislative session ended. Thus, the Wasche decision
remains the applicable law in Minnesota as it pertains to stacking. Based on the recent
activities of the 1979 Legislature, however, the likelihood of the 1980 Legislature passing
some form of antistacking legislation seems to be a certainty.
Although an antistacking provision will not prevent an insurer from collecting an
additional premium when more than one vehicle is owned, such a provision possibly may
prevent insurance costs from escalating beyond the amount attributable to ordinary infla-
tion. By keeping insurance costs to a minimum, an insurer may be able to keep insurance
rates at an affordable level. Because of an antistacking provision, an insured hopefully
will be able to purchase $50,000 of first-party benefits for the same price as it now costs
to purchase $30,000 of first-party coverage. Thus, the additional first-party benefits
available to an insured under the proposed solution will lessen the impact of a premium
windfall to an insurer when multiple vehicles are insured. See notes 103-15 supra and
accompanying text.
183. A study of the Michigan no-fault law disclosed that in the period from October 1,
1973 to December 31, 1975, approximately 200 claims were reported for medical expenses
of $50,000 and over. See Jones, The Michigan Study, in No-FAULT IN ACTION, supra note
177, at 381-82 (Table 1). These figures were obtained by the NAIH, whose member compa-
nies insure about 43% of the private passenger vehicles in Michigan. See id. at 381.
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should ensure full recovery of most parties' economic losses.
Assuming, however, that the stacking of first-party benefits does not
affect premium rates,' raising first-party coverage to $50,000 while
adopting an antistacking provision still is the most equitable resolution
to the stacking problem because it permits insureds owning only one
vehicle to receive more benefits for their insurance dollar. Again, mem-
bers of multicar households may not be substantially prejudiced by the
antistacking legislation because the increased amount of first-party cov-
erage should be sufficient to cover all but the most serious injuries . 5
Finally, by adopting the solution proposed by this Comment, the
Minnesota Legislature will have resolved the definitional problem under
the Minnesota Act, which currently permits dissimilar treatment be-
tween multicar households having one named insured and multicar
households having more than one named insured. 18 Because the stack-
ing of first-party benefits would no longer be permitted, the need to
come within the coverage of a second policy would not arise. Thus, the
definitional problem, as it currently exists, would be resolved.
V. CONCLUSION
The Wasche court's recent decision to permit the stacking of first-
party benefits was supported by sound principles and rationale. To the
extent coverage is available, the court's decision ensures that an injured
party will be fully compensated for any injuries sustained. Of foremost
importance under a mandatory coverage scheme, however, is the need
to keep insurance rates at affordable levels. While the decision in
Wasche provides the insured with maximum insurance coverage, the
effect of the decision may be felt by the policyholders in the form of
increased insurance rates. If, as a result of stacking, the premium rates
become unduly burdensome to the policyholder, the Legislature may
have to promulgate new or amend existing statutory provisions pertain-
ing to stacking so that the motoring public will be able to purchase
insurance coverage at reasonable rates.
184. See notes 169-78 supra and accompanying text. Interestingly, a recent study con-
ducted in Michigan, a no-fault state that permits unlimited medical benefits, see MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.3107(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979), concluded that the effect
of the Michigan No-Fault Act was to reduce the effective cost of insurance to the policy-
holders. See Jones, The Michigan Study, in No-FAULT IN ACTION, supra note 177, at 379-
93. Basing its conclusion on the Consumer Price Index, the Michigan Study indicated that
prices in general had increased 30% since the inception of its no-fault statute, yet no-fault
insurance rates only had increased 20% in the same time period. See id.
185. See note 177 supra.
186. See notes 157-68 supra and accompanying text.
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